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CHAPTER II 
FDA JURISDICTION: A 
MATTER OF DEFINITIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1938 Act gave FDA authority over four broad categories of 
products, all of which the agency still regulates: food, drugs, cosmetics, and 
medical devices. In the ensuing decades, the agency assumed or was given 
responsibility for additional classes of products, some of which (human 
biological products, electronic radiation-emitting products) it continues to 
regulate today, while other& (toys, pesticides) it later ceded to other 
agencies. In addition, Congress has repeatedly tweaked the FD&C Act 
definitions, in some instances establishing entire subcategories with their 
own definitions, such as "food additives" and "dietary supplements" (both 
subcategories of "food"). 
The scope of FDA' s power is defined almost entirely by the list of 
product categories over which it has jurisdiction.* The statutory definitions 
of these categories thus delineate the outer boundaries of the arena within 
which the agency operates. The definitions are also important for another 
reason. FDA has different degrees of power over different categories of 
products. In general, the agency has greater authority over drugs, devices, 
and biological products than over food and cosmetics. The category to 
which FDA-or Congress-assigns an article thus largely controls the 
shape of the regulatory regime the agency will impose on it. 
As the materials in this chapter show, the product definitions are 
strikingly broad and thus confer jurisdiction over a vast range of goods. 
Furthermore, the definitions which are not mutually exclusive, are remark-
ably plastic, providing the agency with great flexibility to decide whether 
and how to regulate products. Sometimes FDA has interpreted the defini-
tions expansively, so as to expand its power. On other occasions, the agency 
has construed the definitions narrowly, so as to avoid taking responsibility 
for products it does not want to regulate or to minimize the burdensome-
ness of the requirements it does impose. 
Occasionally, when FDA interprets the definitions flexibly so as to 
achieve particular policy objectives, the courts will rein in the agency, as 
the Supreme Court did with respect to FDA' s attempts in the 1990s to 
regulate cigarettes as medical devices. FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 
*[The most important exception to this 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
principle is the power FDA shares with the U.S.C. 264) to take measures to control the 
Centers for Disease Control under Section spread of communicable diseases. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097623
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U.S. 120 (2000), infra p. 82. In general, however, as the next case illus-
trates, courts have granted the agency considerable latitude in applying the 
product definitions. 
United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk 
394 U.S. 784 (19691. 
•MR. CHIEF JuSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the court. 
At issue here is the scope of the statutory definition of drug contained 
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the extent of the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's regulatory authority under 
that definition. The specific item involved in this definitional controversy is 
a laboratory aid known as an antibiotic sensitivity disc, used as a screening 
test for help in determining the proper antibiotic drug to administer to 
patients. If the article is a "drug" then the Secretary can subject it to 
pre-market clearance regulations promulgated pursuant to § 507 of the 
Act. If, on the other hand, the article is merely a "device" under the 
Act, it is subject only to the misbranding and adulteration proscriptions of 
the Act and does not have to be pretested before marketing; and, of course, 
if the disc does not fall under either definition, the Act itself is totally 
inapplicable .. 
At the outset, it is clear from § 201 that the word "drug" is a term of 
art for the purposes of the Act, encompassing far more than the strict 
medical definition of that word. 
The historical expansion of the definition of drug, and the creation of a 
parallel concept of devices, clearly show, we think, that Congress fully 
intended that the Act's coverage be as broad as its literal language 
indicates and equally clearly, broader than any strict medical definition 
might otherwise allow. Strong indications from legislative history that 
Congress intended the broad coverage the District Court thought "ridicu-
lous" should satisfy us that the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the 
Act's language as written. But we are all the more convinced that we must 
give effect to congressional intent in view of the well-accepted principle 
that remedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be 
given a liberal construction consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to 
protect the public health, and specifically, § 507's purpose to ensure that 
antibiotic products marketed serve the public with "efficacy" and "safety." 
Respondent's alternative contention, that even if its product does fall 
within the purview of the Act, it is plainly a "device" and therefore by 
definition necessarily not a "drug/' must also be rejected, we believe, in 
light of the foregoing analysis. At the outset, it must be conceded that the 
language of the statute is of little assistance in determining precisely what 
differentiates a "drug" from a "device": to the extent that both are 
intended for use in the treatment, mitigation and cure of disease, the 
former is an "article" and the latter includes "instruments," "apparatus," 
and "contrivances." Despite the obvious areas of overlap in definition, we 
are not entirely without guidance in determining the propriety of the 
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Secretary's decision below, given the overall goals of the Act and its 
legislative history. 
More specifically, ... the "natural way" to draw the line "is in light of 
the statutory purpose." Since the patient will tend to derive less benefit 
and perhaps some harm from a particular antibiotic if, though the drug 
itself was properly batch-tested, it was not the proper antibiotic to use, it 
was entirely reasonable for the Secretary to determine that the discs, like 
the antibiotics they serve, are drugs and similarly subject to pre-clearance 
certification under § 507. An opposite conclusion might undercut the value 
of testing the antibiotics themselves, for such testing would be a useless 
exercise if the wrong drug were ultimately administered, even partially as 
the result of an unreliable disc .... 
Reversed. 
B. Foon 
Section 20l(D of the FD&C Act defines "food" as follows: "The term 
'food' means (1) articles used for food and drink for man or other animals, 
(2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article." 
Not surprisingly, this tautological definition ("food" means "food") leaves 
many open questions. The issue of the definition's precise meaning has 
sometimes arisen in disputes over whether a particular product is a food or 
falls outside FDA's authority altogether. On other occasions, as in the case 
excerpted below, the question has come up when FDA has tried to regulate 
as a drug a product that the manufacturer claims is only a food. Because 
new drugs are subject to premarket approval by the agency for safety and 
effectiveness, whereas foods are not, the resolution of such a dispute over 
application of the food definition frequently determines the fate of the 
product. 
Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker 
713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983) . 
• CUMMINGS, CHIEF JUDGE. 
Plaintiffs manufacture and market a product known as "starch block-
ers" which "block" the human body's digestion of starch as an aid in 
controlling weight. On July 1, 1982, the Food and Drug Administration 
("FDA") classified starch blockers as "drugs" and requested that all such 
products be removed from the market until FDA approval was re-
ceived .... 
The only issue on appeal is whether starch blockers are foods or drugs 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Starch blocker tablets 
and capsules consist of a protein which is extracted from a certain type of 
raw kidney bean. That particular protein functions as an alpha-amylase 
inhibitor; alpha-amylase is an enzyme produced by the body which is 
utilized in digesting starch. When starch blockers are ingested during a 
meal, the protein acts to prevent the alpha-amylase enzyme from acting, 
B FOOD 
thus allowing the undigested starch to pass through the body and avoiding 
the calories that would be realized from its digestion. 
Kidney beans, from which alpha-amylase inhibitor is derived, are 
dangerous if eaten raw. By August 1982, FDA had received seventy-five 
reports of adverse effects on people who had taken starch blockers, includ-
ing complaints of gastro-intestinal distress such as bloating, nausea, ab-
dominal pain, constipation and vomiting. Because plaintiffs consider starch 
blockers to be food, no testing as required to obtain FDA approval as a new 
drug has taken place. If starch blockers were drugs, the manufacturers 
would be required to file a new drug application pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 and remove the product from the marketplace until approved as a 
drug by the FDA. 
The statutory scheme under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a 
complicated one. Section 321(g)(l) provides that the term "drug" means 
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and 
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles 
intended for use as a component of any article specified in clauses 
(A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph; but does not include devices or 
their components, parts, or accessories. 
The term "food" as defined in Section 321(D means 
(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) 
chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such 
article. 
Section 32l(g)(l)(C) was added to the statute in 1938 to expand the 
definition of "drug." The amendment was necessary because certain arti-
cles intended by manufacturers to be used as drugs did not fit within the 
"disease" requirement of Section 321(g)(l)(B). Obesity in particular was 
not considered a disease. Thus "anti-fat remedies" marketed with claims of 
"slenderizing effects" had escaped regulation under the prior defini-
tion ... 
It is well established that the definitions of food and drug are normally 
not mutually exclusive; an article that happens to be a food but is intended 
for use in the treatment of disease fits squarely within the drug definition 
in part B of Section 321(g)(l) and may be regulated as such. Under part C 
of the statutory drug definition, however, "articles (other than food)" are 
expressly excluded from the drug definition (as are devices) in Section 
32l(g)(l)* In order to decide if starch blockers are drugs under Section 
321(g)(l)(C), therefore, we must decide if they are foods within the mean-
ing of the part C "other than food" parenthetical exception to Section 
321(g)(l)(C). And in order to decide the meaning of "food" in that paren-
thetical exception, we must first decide the meaning of "food" in Section 
321(D. 
*[Authors' Note: the definition of 
"drug" at 21 U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l) no longer 
explicitly excludes devices. l 
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Congress defined "food" in Section 321(D as "articles used as food." 
This definition is not too helpful, but it does emphasize that "food" is to be 
defined in terms of its function as food, rather than in terms of its source, 
biochemical composition or ingestibility. Plaintiffs' argument that starch 
blockers are food because they are derived from food-kidney beans-is not 
convincing; if Congress intended food to mean articles derived from food it 
would have so specified. Indeed some articles that are derived from food are 
indisputably not food, such as caffeine and penicillin. In addition, all 
articles that are classed biochemically as proteins cannot be food either, 
because for example, insulin, botulism toxin, human hair and influenza 
virus are proteins that are clearly not food. 
Plaintiffs argue that 21 U.S.C. § 3430) specifying labeling require-
ments for food for special dietary uses indicates that Congress intended 
products offered for weight conditions to come within the statutory defini-
tion of "food." Plaintiffs misinterpret that statutory section. It does not 
define food but merely requires that if a product is a food and purports to 
be for special dietary uses, its label must contain certain information to 
avoid being misbranded. If all products intended to affect underweight or 
overweight conditions were per se foods, no diet product could be regulated 
as a drug under Section 32l(g)(l)(C), a result clearly contrary to the intent 
of Congress that "anti-fat remedies" and "slenderizers" qualify as drugs 
under that Section. 
If defining food in terms of its source or defining it in terms of its 
biochemical composition is clearly wrong, defining food as articles intended 
by the manufacturer to be used as food is problematic. When Congress 
meant to define a drug in terms of its intended use, it explicitly incorporat-
ed that element into its statutory definition. For example, Section 
32l(g)(l)(B) defines drugs as articles "intended for use" in, among other 
things, the treatment of disease; Section 32l(g)(l)(C) defines drugs as 
"articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body of man or other animals." The definition of food in Section 
32l(D omits any reference to intent .... Further, a manufacturer cannot 
avoid the reach of the FDA by claiming that a product which looks like food 
and smells like food is not food because it was not intended for consump-
tion. In United States v. Technical Egg Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. 
Ga. 1959), the defendant argued that the eggs at issue were not adulterated 
food under the Act because they were not intended to be eaten. The court 
held that there was a danger of their being diverted to food use and 
rejected defendant's argument. 
Although it is easy to reject the proffered food definitions, it is difficult 
to arrive at a satisfactory one. In the absence of clearcut Congressional 
guidance, it is best to rely on statutory language and common sense. The 
statute evidently uses the word "food" in two different ways. The statutory 
definition of "food" in Section 32l(D is a term of art and is clearly intended 
to be broader than the common-sense definition of food, because the 
statutory definition of "food" also includes chewing gum and food addi-
tives. Food additives can be any substance the intended use of which 
results or may reasonably [be expected to] result in its becoming a compo-
nent or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 32l(s). Paper food-packaging when containing polychlorinated biphenyls 
B Fooo 
, I'( ~B's), for example, is an adulterated food because the PCB's may 
>01grnte from the package to the food and thereby become a component of 
'1 Yet the statutory definition of "food" also includes in Section 
::~ l(l)(l) the common-sense definition of food. When the statute defines 
·rood" as "articles used for food," it means that the statutory definition of 
rood" includes articles used by people in the ordinary way most people use 
1 .. od-primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive value. To hold as did the 
>I istrict court that articles used as food are articles used solely for taste, 
:1roma or nutritive value is unduly restrictive since some products such as 
··offee or prune juice are undoubtedly food but may be consumed on 
1 iccasion for reasons other than taste, aroma, or nutritive value. 
This double use of the word "food" in Section 321(!) makes it difficult 
Io interpret the parenthetical "other than food" exclusion in the Section 
::2l(g)(l)(C) drug definition. As shown by that exclusion, Congress obvious-
ly meant a drug to be something "other than food," but was it referring to 
'"food" as a term of art in the statutory sense or to foods in their ordinary 
meaning? Because all such foods are "intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man or other animals" and would thus come 
within the part C drug definition, presumably Congress meant to exclude 
common-sense foods. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide this question 
here because starch blockers are not food in either sense.* The tablets and 
pills at issue are not consumed primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive 
value under Section 321(!)(1); in fact, as noted earlier, they are taken for 
their ability to block the digestion of food and aid in weight loss. In 
addition, starch blockers are not chewing gum under Section 321(!)(2) and 
are not components of food under Section 321(!)(3). To qualify as a drug 
under Section 321(g)(l)(C), the articles must not only be articles "other 
than food," but must also be "intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals." Starch blockers indisputably 
satisfy this requirement for they are intended to affect digestion in the 
people who take them. Therefore, starch blockers are drugs under Section 
~21(g)(l)(C) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
Affirmed. 
NOTES 
1. Dual Classification. It is indisputable that a product fitting the common 
sense definition of a "food" in section 201(f) is also subject to regulation as a drug 
*The FDA urges an interpretation of the 
:->tatute that would allow drug regulation of a 
product if, for example, an appetite suppres-
sant were added to a recognized food. Accord-
ing to the FDA, addition of the drug might 
1nake it a "component" and therefore subject 
to regulation as a statutory "food". A::. such, 
the literal language of Section 321(g)(l)(C) 
would preclude regulation as a drug because 
the product would qualify as a statutory 
"food''. Even if Section 321(g)(l)(C) meant 
1Jnly to exclude common-sense foods, an arti-
cle might still be considered food unless addi-
l ion of an appetite suppressant so changed its 
nature that it was no longer used primarily 
for taste, aroma or nutritional value. The 
FDA submits that a drug manufacturer could 
easily escape drug regulation by simply add-
ing the drug to a food. 
It is not necessary to resolve this prob-
lem in order to resolve this case. We merely 
note the possibility that the word "compo-
nent" might be interpreted to exclude sub-
stances specifically added to a food to avoid 
bringing the substance within the drug defi-
nition, and, as noted above, a food may lose 
its food character if a drug is added. 
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under section 201(g)(l)(B) if the manufacturer makes a therapeutic claim for it. See 
Senate Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1935). In American Health Products 
Co., Inc. v. Hayes, 574 F. Supp. 1498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case brought about the same 
time as Nutrilab by a different starchblocker manufacturer, the government ad-
vanced a bolder argument. It contended that a food is subject to dual classification, 
even in the absence of a therapeutic claim, if there is a claim regarding a specific 
physiological effect (that is, a structure or function claim). The United States 
asserted that a product making such a claim falls outside the food exclusion from 
section 201(g)(l)(C)'s definition of "drug," even if it is also a common sense food 
under section 201(1). Although the District Court held for the government on the 
same grounds as the Seventh Circuit in Nutrilab, it rejected FDA's argument as to 
dual classification. 
The government's contention [in favor of dual classification] is untena-
ble. Though most sections of the Act countenance dual classification, no 
other contains a parenthetical like that Congress inserted in part (C). 
Ignoring that parenthetical would render meaningless the distinctions 
Congress has attempted to delineate. Nevertheless, the government is 
correct in claiming that starchblocker pills are a "drug" under the Act, 
because the pills are not a "food" in any sense cognizable under the 
statute .. 
In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit specifically stated that ''we do not 
reach the issue whether dual classification is appropriate under section 
32l(g)(l)(C)." American Health Prods. Co. v. Hayes, 744 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam). 
2. Caffeine. FDA regulates over-the-counter stimulants in which caffeine is 
the active ingredient as drugs. 21 C.F.R. Part 340. However, when caffeine is added 
to food, such as a soft drink, the agency does not regulate the product as a drug 
even if the manufacturer promotes the food's high level of caffeine and its "energiz-
ing" qualities. Apparently, in FDA's view, such products fall within the food 
exception to the structure/function drug definition in section 20l(g)(l)(C). 
3. The Impact of DSHEA. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act 
of 1994 (DSHEA) amended the FD&C Act in a way that dramatically changed the 
categorization question for products such as starchblockers. A product that satisfies 
DSHEA's definition of a "dietary supplement" is now automatically classified as a 
food, regardless of whether it satisfies Nutrilab's "common sense" test. Indeed, 
i'starch-blocking" amylase inhibitors derived from kidney beans are currently 
marketed as dietary supplements, and thus as foods. Nonetheless, for products that 
do not qualify as dietary supplements under DSHEA, Nutrilab's "common sense" 
definition of food still applies. DSHEA is addressed in detail below, infra p. 260. 
4. Structure/Function Claims Versus Disease Claims. The line between struc-
ture/function claims and disease claims can be a maddeningly indistinct one. 
Nevertheless, FDA did not set forth a comprehensive analysis of the distinction 
until 2000. We consider the agency's assessment of the difference between the types 
of claims, infra p. 276. 
COMMENT: OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE DEFINITION OF 
"FOOD" 
Food Additives. As explained by the Nutrilab court, the distinction 
between a food and a drug is critical because new drugs, unlike convention-
al foods, are subject to the requirement of premarket approval by FDA. The 
manufacturer of a new drug must establish to FDA that its product is safe 
and effective before the agency will approve it. Observe, however, that 
B FOOD 
1 liere is a subcategory of foods, called "food additives," that are subject to a 
premarket safety approval by the agency. The definition of food in section 
~Ol(D includes "articles used for components" of food or drink. As set forth 
111 section 20l(s) of the FD&C Act, "The term 'food additive' means any 
"1 bstance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected 
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise 
affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such substance is not 
µ;enerally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate its safety to be safe under the conditions of its 
intended use." The exemption for foods that are generally recognized as 
safe (GRAS) frees most conventional food ingredients from the requirement 
of premarket approval. Section 20l(s) also lists a number of specific 
exceptions to the definition of "food additive." This section is examined in 
detail infra Chapter III. 
Migrating Food-Contact Materials. The statutory definition of food 
includes substances that migrate to food from food packaging and dinner-
ware, even before such migration takes place. Natick Paperboard Corp. v. 
Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1975); United States u. Articles of Food 
Consisting of Pottery .. Labeled Cathy Rose, 370 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich. 
1974). 
Chewing Gum. Section 201(0(2) of the FD&C Act specifically classifies 
chewing gum as food. As a result, FDA has taken the position that when 
snuff is included in a masticatory carrier base, which has the appearance of 
a piece of confectionary, it is properly regulated as a food. See Letter from 
FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs J.M. Taylor to S.M. 
Pape (Apr. 11, 1988). 
No Longer "Fit" Food. A product is a food under the Act if it is 
generally regarded as food when sold in food form even if it is decomposed 
or otherwise unfit for food at the time FDA institutes legal action against 
it. See, e.g., United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974); 
Otis McAllister & Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1952); United 
States u. O.F. Bayer & Co., 188 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v. 52 
Drums Maple Syrup, 110 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Techni-
cal Egg Products, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1959); United States v. 
Thirteen Crates of Frozen Eggs, 215 F. 584 (2d Cir. 1914). See also 
Annotation: What is "Food" Within Meaning of Statute, 17 A.L.R. 1282 
(1922). 
COMMENT: OTHER AGENCIES' ROLES IN REGULATING FOOD 
Several categories of food products are subject to specific regulatory 
requirements. 
Meat, Poultry, and Eggs. These products are regulated by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Federal Meat Inspec-
tion Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq., the Poultry Products Inspection Act, 
21 U.S.C. 451 et seq., and the Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. 1031 
et seq. USDA has ceded to FDA jurisdiction over any food that is less than 
two percent meat or poultry. The jurisdiction of USDA and FDA over these 
three categories of food products is otherwise complex and uncertain. FDA 
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has exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over live animals intended to be used 
for food. United States v. Tomahara Enterprises, Ltd., Food Drug Cosm. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,217 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). USDA has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the slaughter of food animals and over the subsequent processing of meat 
and poultry, except that USDA and FDA have joint jurisdiction over the 
use of food additives in meat and poultry. After processing, USDA and FDA 
have joint jurisdiction over the distribution of meat and poultry up to the 
retail establishment where it is sold. FDA has exclusive jurisdiction over 
retail food establishments. D& W Food Centers, Inc. v. Block, 786 F.2d 751 
(6th Cir. 1986), held that a central kitchen making pizza containing meat 
was not subject to the continuous inspection requirements of the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act. See generally Food Regulation: A Case Study of USDA 
and FDA, in "Study on Federal Regulation: Regulatory Organization," 
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. V, at 
Ch. 4 (Comm. Print 1977). 
The FMIA has long applied to the meat of only five named species 
(cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and equines), and not to meat of other species 
such as rabbit, venison, or bison, which remained within FDA's purview. 
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 601(j) (definition of "meat food product"). In 2005, 
however, Congress, as part of the FY 2006 Agriculture Appropriations bill, 
119 Stat. 2120, amended the FMIA to extend the USDA inspection system 
to all "amenable species," defined as the above species plus "any additional 
species of livestock that the Secretary considers appropriate." 21 U.S.C. 
601(w)(2). 
FDA has primary responsibility for the safety and labeling of shell 
eggs, although the voluntary grading of shell eggs is done under USDA 
supervision. Egg processing plants that wash, sort, break, and pasteurize 
eggs are under USDA jurisdiction, as are processed products known for 
their egg content. 
Alcoholic Beverages. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 
(TTB) of the Department of the Treasury has jurisdiction over alcoholic 
beverages under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 
(1935), codified in 27 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms in the Department of the Treasury formerly performed this 
~ 
function, but the Homeland Security Act of 2002 shifted certain law 
enforcement responsibilities of BATF to the Department of Justice and 
kept tax and trade regulation within a newly-named unit of the Treasury 
Department. TTB regulates all beer products regardless of their alcohol 
content. 51 Fed. Reg. 39666 (Oct. 30, 1986). In contrast, TTB regulates 
only those wine products that contain 7 percent alcohol or more, and FDA 
regulates all wine products containing less than 7 percent alcohol. FDA 
Compliance Policy Guide No. 7101.05 (Oct. 1, 1980). Attempts to amend 
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act to extend the Department of the 
Treasury's jurisdiction to wine products containing as little as 0.5 percent 
alcohol have been unsuccessful. Accordingly, wine coolers, which have an 
alcohol content of less than 7 percent, are regulated by FDA rather than 
TTB. 
One court has held that the labeling of alcoholic beverages (except for 
wine products containing less than 7 percent alcohol) is subject only to 
C COSMETICS 
I \ATF (now TTB) jurisdiction and is exempt from the labeling require-
ments of the FD&C Act. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. 
Slipp. 5 (W.D. Ky. 1976). In other respects, however, alcoholic beverages 
are regulated as food by FDA, although the two agencies have a memoran-
dum of understanding that confirms TTB's primary responsibility for 
overseeing voluntary recalls of adulterated products. See FDA Compliance 
Policy Guide No. 7155.04 (Nov. 1987); Elaine T. Byszewski, What's in the 
Wine? A History of FDA's Role, 57 Foon & DRUG L.J. 545 (2002); Iver P. 
Cooper, The FDA, the BATF, and Liquor Labeling: A Case Study of 
Interagency Jurisdictional Conflict, 34 Foon DRUG CosM. L.J. 370 (1979); 
Mary Hancock, Federal Jurisdictional Disputes in the Labeling and Adver-
tising of Malt Beverages, 34 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 271 (1979); Symposium 
on Alcoholic Beverage Control, 7 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 543 (1940). FDA 
has also adopted Compliance Policy Guide 7101.04, 54 Fed. Reg. 38559 
(Sept. 19, 1989), governing the labeling of dealcoholized wine beverages. 
Water and Ice. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660 
(1974), general responsibility for the purity of drinking water was placed in 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but section 410 was added to 
the FD&C Act to preserve FDA's jurisdiction over bottled drinking water. 
The agency also has jurisdiction over ice. See C.W. Felix, Ice-the Forgotten 
Food, 53 J. Ass'N Foon & DRuG OFFICIALS 19 (July 1989). Water used to 
process food or as an ingredient in food is subject to the same requirements 
under the FD&C Act as any other food constituent. 
C. COSMETICS 
Section 201(i) of the FD&C Act defines "cosmetic" as "(l) articles 
intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or 
otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, 
beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance, and (2) 
articles intended for use as a component of any such articles; except that 
such term shall not include soap." Cosmetics are the least intensively 
regulated of all the product categories under FDA's jurisdiction. There is no 
premarket approval requirement for any cosmetic or cosmetic ingredient, 
with the exception of color additives. But, like foods, cosmetics may be 
simultaneously classified as drugs. Moreover, because the structure/func-
tion leg of the drug definition, section 201(g)(l)(C), does not contain an 
exception for cosmetics, as it does for food, a cosmetic may be dual-
classified as a drug even if it is a nontherapeutic product intended only to 
affect the structure or any function of the body. The question of when a 
cosmetic is also a drug is addressed later in this chapter, infra p. 48. 
Section 201(i)-the "cosmetic" definition itself-has raised relatively 
few interpretive questions. Even so, several features of this provision 
deserve further discussion. 
NOTES 
1. Odors. FDA considers products intended to inask or prevent body odors, 
such as mouthwashes and underarm deodorants, to be cosmetics. 
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2. Soap Exemption. The FD&C Act does not define "soap." FDA has defined 
the scope of the soap exemption by regulation. According to the agency, the 
exemption applies only to articles that meet the following conditions: "(1) The bulk 
of the nonvolatile matter in the product consists of an alkali salt of fatty acids and 
the detergent properties of the article are due to the alkali-fatty acid compounds; 
and (2) The product is labeled, sold, and represented only as soap." 23 Fed. Reg. 
7483 (Sept. 26, 1958), codified at 21 C.F.R. 701.20. If a product is intended not only 
for cleansing but also for other cosmetic uses, such as beautifying, moisturizing, or 
deodorizing, FDA will regulate it as a cosmetic. The exemption is thus quite narrow, 
and most products on the soap shelves of stores are cosmetics. In United States v. 
An Article of Cosmetic Beacon Castile Shampoo, 1969-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 149 
(N.D. Ohio 1973), the court held that the claimant had the burden of proving the 
product fell within the soap exemption. The court acknowledged that a shampoo 
made from soap would fall within that exemption, but concluded that the claimant's 
shampoo did not qualify because it contained a synthetic detergent. 
A soap-like product may also be a drug if it is intended to cure, treat or prevent 
disease or to affect the structure or any function of the human body. It remains 
unclear whether simply calling a soap product "antibacterial" renders it a drug, see 
infra p. 57, but any explicit therapeutic claims indisputably place a soap product in 
the drug category. 
3. Tattoos. FDA regulates the inks used in tattoos and permanent makeup as 
cosmetics and the pigments used in these inks as color additives. Office of Cosmetics 
& Colors Fact Sheet: Tattoos & Permanent Makeup, Nov. 29, 2000. FDA, however, 
does not regulate the actual practice of tattooing; instead, oversight is left to local 
laws and jurisdictions. 
4. Animal Cosmetics. The FD&C Act's definition of "cosmetic" is limited to 
articles intended to be applied to the "human body." Products intended to cleanse 
or promote the attractiveness of animals thus fall outside FDA's control. Cf United 
States v. Articles of Drug for Veterinary Use ... Goshen Laboratories, Inc., Food 
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,174 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (claimant argued that the 
veterinary products involved were "canine cosmetics" not subject to the FD&C Act, 
but court concluded the articles were animal drugs under FDA control). By 
contrast, the FD&C Act's definitions of "food," "drug," and "device" (but not the 
definition of "biological product" in the Public Health Service Act) refer to "man or 
other animals." 
5. Cosmetic Foods. Because breath freshening is a cosmetic effect, the line 
between foods and cosmetics can ;'ometimes be elusive. For example, some dissolva-
ble "breath strips" have been labeled as foods, whereas most are now labeled as 
cosmetics. FDA apparently has not voiced its opinion on the proper categorization of 
these products. 
COMMENT: ARE COSMETIC DEVICES "COSMETICS"? 
Are combs, nail files, or razor blades "cosmetics"? The requirement that a 
cosmetic be ''rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise 
applied to the human body" seems to exclude many common household implements 
from the definition, despite their cosmetic uses. Indeed, prior to the passage of the 
FD&C Act, a Senate report considering this language declared, "[T]he definition of 
the term cosmetic does not include devices .... " S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1935). Nevertheless, until the early 1960s, FDA, on rare occasions, took 
legal action against household devices such as hair brushes, stockings, and tooth-
picks under the cosmetic provisions of the Act. In more recent decades, although the 
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'.(·ncy has never explicitly disclaimed its authority to classify such products as 
, "-'"'1netics, it has declined to assert jurisdiction over them. 
In 2003, FDA took regulatory action against a type of device under the 
,-u_-..;1netics provisions of the Act, apparently for the first time in many years. FDA 
d1·clared that noncorrective decorative contact lenses were not medical devices, see 
, 11 fi·a p. 61, but it simultaneously asserted that they qualified as cosmetics and 
\1·1 iuld be regulated as such. The agency observed that "decorative contact lenses are 
.1rticles intended to be introduced into the eye, which is a part of the body, to 
li1 ·autify the wearer, promote the attractiveness of the wearer, or alter the wearer's 
.q>pearance." 68 Fed. Reg. 16520, 16521 (Apr. 4, 2003). In asserting that these 
pl'oducts were cosmetics, the agency observed: "The fact that contact lenses are 
·devices' in the colloquial sense does not preclude cosmetic status under the act. 
l•'DA has previously determined that section 201(i) of the act applies to appearance-
('nhancing devices such as wigs, hair brushes, stockings and toothpicks." Later that 
yl~ar, FDA sent a warning letter to a distributor of decorative contact lenses, 
;1:-;serted that the lenses were adulterated cosmetics (because they were distributed 
without the involvement of a qualified eye care professional) and misbranded 
( ·osmetics (because their labeling failed to include sufficient instructions or warn-
ings). Warning Letter from 'rimothy Ulatowski, Director, CDRH Office of Compli-
ance, to BWild Inc. (Sept. 16, 2003). The agency has since sent similar letters to at 
least two other distributors of decorative contact lenses. 
D. DRUGS AND DEVICES 
In general, drugs and devices are subject to much more rigorous 
regulatory regimes than food or cosmetics. Most important, since 1938, 
"new drugs" have been subject to premarket approval, and since 1976, 
many medical devices have been subject to either premarket approval or to 
the requirement that their manufacturers demonstrate that they are sub-
stantially equivalent to products already on the market. Consequently, a 
determination that a product is a drug or device is often tantamount to a 
determination that the product cannot be sold at all until FDA approves it 
for marketing. 
Section 20l(g)(l) of the FD&C Act defines "drug" as follows: 
The term ''drug'' means 
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopo-
eia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or 
official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
and 
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and 
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man or other animals; and 
(D) articles intended for use as a component of any article speci-
fied in clause (A), (B), or (C) .... 
Section 20l(h) of the FD&C Act defines "device" as follows: 
The term "device" means an instrument, apparatus, imple-
ment, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other 
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similar or related article, including any component, part, or acces-
sory, which is-
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United 
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, 
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, 
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in 
man or other animals, or 
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals, 
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through 
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and 
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achieve-
ment of its primary intended purposes. 
The Act's definitions of drug and device are parallel in many respects. 
This chapter focuses primarily on their common elements, while the 
distinctions between drugs and devices are considered in Chapter VII, 
which examines device regulation. 
1. INCLUSION IN OFFICIAL COMPENDIA 
Section 321(g)(l)(A) of the Act includes within the definition of "drug" 
any article "recognized in the official United States Pharmacopeia, official 
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National 
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them." The definition of "device" 
contains a parallel provision. See FD&C Act 32l(h)(l). 
The United States Pharmacopeia and National Formulary (USP-NF) 
is a compendium of standards for drug strength, quality, purity, packaging, 
labeling, and storage, published by the United States Pharmacopeia (USP), 
a nongovernmental organization more than a century old. The National 
Formulary was published separately by the American Pharmaceutical Asso-
ciation until 1975, when USP acquired the NF and combined the two 
publications under one cover. In addition to products universally viewed as 
drugs, the USP-NF also contains standards for most vitamins and miner-
als. The Homeopathic Pharmacopeia contains many herbal products. 
Although section 32l(g)(l)(A) appears on its face to give FDA the 
power to treat any item listed in these compendia as a drug, the agency 
generally has not viewed this provision so expansively. When FDA has 
attempted to regulate products as drugs based solely on their inclusion in 
the USP or NF, courts have usually thwarted these efforts. Compare 
National Nutritional Foods Assoc. v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 788-89 (2d Cir. 
1974) (rejecting argument that vitamins and minerals are drugs because of 
their recognition in the official compendia); National Nutritional Foods 
Association v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 337-38 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the 
argument with regard to high potency vitamins); and U.S. v. An Article of 
Drug ... Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), affd without op. 535 F.2d 
1248 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting the argument with regard to pregnancy test 
kit), with U.S. v. Articles of Drug ... Beuthanasia, Food Drug Cosm. L. 
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&p. (CCH) ~ 38,265 (D. Neb. 1979) (accepting the argument with regard to 
animal euthanasia drug). 
In U.S. v. Ova II, a federal district court considering the regulatory 
status of a pregnancy test concluded that the official compendia provision 
of the drug definition "cannot be taken literally," because a literal inter-
pretation would "run[ ] afoul of the principle that a legislative body may 
not lawfully delegate its functions to a private citizen or organization." 
Nonetheless, the court observed that the inclusion of a product in such a 
compendium has real, if limited, legal significance. 
[T]he first definition, i.e., recognition in the U.S.P. or other named 
compendium must be read to mean that: 
(a) an article put into the stream of interstate commerce with 
the intention that it be used for medicinal purposes, as evidenced 
by the label designation "U.S.P.," "N.F.," and the like, must meet 
the privately designated standards for quality and strength, or else 
be subject to appropriate action for misbranding or adulteration; 
(b) the recognition of an item in the U.S.P., etc., by a mono-
graph, coupled with a label indicating compliance with standards, 
constitutes evidence that the item is a "drug" as a matter of prima 
facie proof only, calling on the opposing party to come forward 
with contrary evidence or else risk an adverse ruling; 
(d) an item recognized in U.S.P., etc., such as sodium hydrox-
ide, hydrochloric acid, or whatever, by name, is not a drug if it is 
put into the channels of interstate commerce without a label such 
as "U.S.P.," "N.F." and the like, to imply that it is intended for 
medicinal use. 
414 F. Supp. at 665-66. 
For a further analysis of the official compendia provision of the drug 
definition, see National Nutritional Foods Ass'n u. Mathews, infra p. 42. 
2. "INTENDED UsE" AND THE FooD-DRUG SPECTRUM 
The most important similarity between the definitions of "drug" and 
"device" is their common reference to "intended" use. In most instances, if 
a product is ''intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention" of disease or is "intended to affect the structure or function 
of the body," it is either a drug or a device. Not surprisingly, there have 
been countless disputes over the meaning of "intent" and over the types of 
evidence required to establish intent. 
For both drugs and devices, FDA has used the following regulatory 
definition of "intended use" since 1952: 
The words intended uses or words of similar import refer to 
the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the 
labeling of drugs. The intent is determined by such persons' 
expressions or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding 
the distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for 
example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral 
or written statements by such persons or their representatives. It 
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may be shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the 
knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and 
used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised. 
The intended uses of an article may change after it has been 
introduced into interstate commerce by its manufacturer. If, for 
example, a packer, distributor, or seller intends an article for 
different uses than those intended by the person from whom he 
received the drug [device], such packer, distributor, or seller is 
required to supply adequate labeling in accordance with the new 
intended uses. But if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of 
facts that would give him notice, that a drug [device] introduced 
into interstate commerce by him is to be used for conditions, 
purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he is 
required to provide adequate labeling for such a drug [device] 
which accords with such other uses to which the article is to be 
put. 
21 C.F.R. 201.128 (drugs); 21 C.F.R. 801.4 (devices). This definition articu-
lates an extremely broad view of the types of evidence the agency can rely 
upon to establish a product's intended use. However, FDA has rarely 
attempted to classify a product as a drug or device in the absence of 
relevant representations by the manufacturer or distributor. The following, 
seminal case concerns one of the rare instances in which the agency 
attempted to do so. 
The case involves high-dose vitamin supplements. FDA traditionally 
classified vitamin and mineral products as foods unless therapeutic claims 
were made for them. In the early 1970s, however, the agency was confront-
ed with reports of people experiencing toxic effects from large doses of 
vitamins A and D. Adelle Davis, a self-proclaimed nutritional expert who 
advocated a "natural" approach to good health, recommended megadoses of 
these vitamins in her books. Vitamins A and D are fat-soluble nutrients 
(which accumulate in fatty tissue), and FDA thus concluded that ingestion 
of excess quantities of these vitamins could lead to serious harm. 
To meet this problem, FDA promulgated regulations, 37 Fed. Reg. 
26618 (Dec. 14, 1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 20723 (Aug. 2, 1973), classifying 
preparations providing more than 10,000 international units (IU) of vita-
min A or 400 IU of vitamin D per daily serving as drugs and requiring 
further that they be sold or:rly on prescription. Vitamin manufacturers 
challenged these regulations in court. The District Court initially upheld 
the regulations, National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F. 
Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), but the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
administrative record was incomplete. It remanded the case with instruc-
tions that the district court inquire into the FDA Commissioner's reason-
ing. 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975). After conducting the mandated hearing, 
the District Court once again upheld the regulations, 418 F. Supp. 394 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), and the plaintiffs appealed for a second time. 
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews 
557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977). 
• RoBERT P. ANDERSON, CrncurT JunGE, 
When this case was previously remanded by us to the district 
court, we said, " a serious question is raised as to whether the 
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( 'ommissioner, in concluding that the higher level dosage forms of Vitamins 
\ and D are 'drugs,' acted 'in accordance with law.' " ... In the statement 
"n nouncing the proposal of the Vitamins A and D regulations and in the 
'nie accompanying their adoption, the Commissioner did not rely upon the 
n•cognition of these preparations in the [official compendia] as the basis of 
I he drug classification. Rather, the Commissioner determined that the 
circumstances surrounding the use of Vitamins A and D at the regulated 
levels indicated an intended therapeutic use under § 20l(g)(l)(B). The 
vendors' intent in selling the product to the public is the key element in 
lhis statutory definition. 
In determining whether an article is a "drug" because of an intended 
therapeutic use, the FDA is not bound by the manufacturer's subjective 
claims of intent but can find actual therapeutic intent on the basis of 
objective evidence. Such intent also may be derived or inferred from 
labeling, promotional material, advertising, and "any other relevant 
source." [Case citations omitted.] In remanding this case, this court ex-
pressly indicated that evidence that Vitamins A and D at the regulated 
levels were used "almost exclusively for therapeutic purposes" when cou-
pled with lack of a recognized nutritional use, would be sufficient to show 
that high dosage Vitamins A and D products were intended for use in the 
treatment of disease. 
In proposing the regulations, the Commissioner emphasized the poten-
tial for toxicity and the widespread promotion of the intake of high doses of 
Vitamins A and D to cure a variety of ills. To show objective therapeutic 
intent, the Commissioner's affidavit submitted on remand relied upon 
three factors: (1) widespread promotion to the public in the use of high 
potency Vitamins A and D preparations for the treatment of various 
ailments; (2) lack of recognized nutritional usefulness; and (3) potential for 
toxicity from the ingestion of large doses of these vitamins over extended 
periods of time .. 
Plaintiffs assert that toxicity is irrelevant to the issue of therapeutic 
intent and, although the key element in determining that a drug should be 
limited to prescription use under § 503(b) of the Act, it has no bearing 
upon whether an article is a drug. The Government argues, on the other 
hand, that toxicity is relevant to therapeutic intent and that the Commis-
sioner must make the decision of whether there should be a regulation 
which classifies an article as a food or as a drug, for the purposes of the 
Act. Although an article may be recognized as a food, this does not preclude 
it from being regulated as a drug. The determination that an article is 
properly regulated as a drug, however, is not left to the Commissioner's 
unbridled discretion to act to protect the public health but must be in 
accordance with the statutory definition. Toxicity is not included as an 
element in the statutory definition of a drug. It is relevant as a factor 
supporting the Commissioner's classification under § 201(g)(l)(B), but only 
to the extent that it constitutes objective evidence of therapeutic intent. 
Toxicity is cited by the Commissioner as constituting objective evidence of 
"something more" than lack of nutritional usefulness .... Such evidence, 
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however, only presents a further indication that the excessive intake of 
Vitamins A and D may not be nutritionally useful and does not provide the 
objective evidence of therapeutic intent necessary to support these regula-
tions. 
There is no evidence in the administrative record that the manufactur-
ers and vendors of Vitamins A and D preparations, at the regulated 
dosages, represent through labeling, promotional materials, or advertising 
that these products are effective in the cure or treatment of disease. They 
are sold as "dietary supplements." ... 
The main issue on this appeal is whether the evidence of the extensive 
use of large doses of Vitamins A and D to treat or prevent diseases and the 
promotion of such usage by persons not associated with the manufacturers 
or vendors establishes such widespread therapeutic use at the regulated 
levels as to overcome the plaintiffs' claim of the lack of an intended use to 
cure or prevent disease and thus justifies the Commissioner's determina-
tion. 
The Commissioner admits that below the stated levels of potency, 
Vitamins A and D are foods. The evidence relied upon to show therapeutic 
intent, therefore, must be related to the potency level chosen to differenti-
ate between the use of Vitamins A and D as foods and the use of these 
vitamins as drugs. The administrative record clearly establishes that the 
factors involved in choosing the levels at which Vitamins A and D become 
drugs were solely related to the Commissioner's fear of potential toxic 
effect and his belief that the ingestion of vitamins at levels above the U.S. 
RDA is not nutritionally useful. No further record evidence has been 
produced on the remand to show that the 10,000 IU and 400 IU levels were 
chosen because at those potencies, consumption of them is almost exclu-
sively for therapeutic purposes. A sampling of the comments submitted to 
the FDA after publication of the proposed regulations reveals that people 
believe that a wide range of doses of these vitamins are therapeutically 
useful. A large group of individuals indicated that they ingested these 
vitamins at various dosages solely to supplement their daily diet in the 
belief that more Vitamins A and D were needed to maintain optimal health 
than the upper limits in the U.S.,.RDA. 
In remanding this case, this court suggested that proof in the record 
demonstrating that, at the 10,000 IU and 400 IU levels, respectively, these 
vitamins were taken "almost exclusively" for therapeutic purposes, would 
tend to show that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. There 
was no evidence, however, supporting the Commissioner's conclusion that, 
when sold at the regulated, i.e. prescription, levels, therapeutic usage of 
these vitamins so far outweighed their use as dietary supplements, it 
showed an objective intent that these products were used in the mitigation 
and cure of diseases. This claim furnished no contradiction to the charge 
that the FDA's regulations are arbitrary and capricious and not in accor-
dance with law .... 
The Commissioner also seeks to justify the Vitamins A and D regula-
tions on the basis of § 201(g)(l)(A), which defines as drugs, articles 
"recognized" in the United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) or National For-
mulary (NF) .... To construe § 201(g)(l)(A) so as to grant the Commis-
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sioner the power to regulate as drugs every item mentioned in the USP and 
NF solely on the basis of such inclusion would give the FDA virtually 
11 nlimited discretion to regulate as drugs a vast range of items. . . . An 
administrator's decision under a regulatory statute, such as the Food, 
I lrug, and Cosmetic Act, must be governed by an intelligible statutory 
principle. If§ 20l(g)(l)(A) defines as drugs every item included in the USP 
and NF, the FDA is not being consistent in its treatment of other items 
similarly recognized. The Commissioner, therefore, has not applied the 
~ 20l(g)(l)(A) definition to every item in the compendia. Rather he has 
singled out for drug classification items included in the USP and NF on the 
basis of factors, such as toxicity in this case, that are not relevant to the 
statutory criteria in § 20l(g). 
The Commissioner admitted in his affidavit that mere inclusion in the 
USP and NF is an insufficient basis for drug classification after the 
decision in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n u. FDA [504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 
1974)]. He attempts to distinguish that case on the ground that Vitamins A 
and D are recognized at therapeutic dosages in the compendia and are 
regulated as drugs in this case only at levels in excess of the recognized 
food levels in the USP. Other articles, however, are recognized in the 
compendia at therapeutic levels and not regulated as drugs, for example 
Vitamin C. The Commissioner must, therefore, show that the conflicting 
treatment in the regulations of items similarly classified in the USP and 
NF is not arbitrary under the applicable criteria. The FDA regulates 
Vitamin C preparations at the USP' s therapeutic level as food. To justify 
the regulation of Vitamins A and D as drugs by relying on § 20l(g)(l)(A) 
the Commissioner would have to distinguish his treatment of Vitamin C as 
food. 
In proposing and adopting these regulations for Vitamins A and D, the 
Commissioner did not rely upon or cite the recognition of these vitamins in 
the USP and NF. He may not at this late hour on appeal rely upon them as 
the basis for his drug classification because it is sheer post hoc rationaliza-
tion .... 
NOTES 
1. Subsequent Proceedings. Following this decision, FDA revoked the chal~ 
lenged regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 10551 (Mar. 14, 1978). 
2. Dual Classification. There is no doubt that a product can be classified 
simultaneously as both a therapeutic drug under section 201(g)(l)(B) and as a food. 
Indeed, a product currently marketed as a food may at the same time undergo 
clinical investigation for drug uses (in compliance with the FDA investigational 
drug requirements, discussed infra p. 624). See, e.g., "Nutrition Education-1973: 
Phosphate Research and Dental Decay," Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. 
on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 549 (1973). 
On various occasions, courts have upheld FDA's reliance on the Act's broad 
definition of "drug" to regulate products that were concededly also subject to the 
food provisions of the Act. In the following cases, courts held that products 
ordinarily regarded as foods were properly classified as drugs because of the claims 
made for them: United States v. 250 Jars "Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy 
Pure Honey", 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. 24 Bottles "Sterling 
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Vinegar and Honey", 338 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Hohensee, 243 
F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957) (tea); United States v. 500 Plastic Bottles "Wilfley's Bio 
Water," Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,143 (D. Or. 1989) (water); United 
States v. Kollman, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,342 CD. Or. 1985 & 1986) 
(blue-green algae harvested from Klamath Lake, Oregon). In each instance, the 
agency invoked the drug definition in order to demand premarket testing and 
approval, As discussed infra p. 49, a product can also be simultaneously both a drug 
and a cosmetic. 
3. Once a Drug? In United States v. Articles of Drug . Neptone, Food Drug 
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,240 (N.D. Cal. 1983), FDA contended that the seized 
product was a drug and was granted summary judgment based on the following 
reasoning: 
Claimant Aquaculture Corporation markets in the United States a 
product called Neptone, which is freeze-dried, homogenized, powdered New 
Zealand green mussel (Perna canaliculus) in capsule form. In 1976, claim-
ant received from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") an Investi-
gational Exemption for New Drug ("IND") for Neptone. The purpose of 
this exemption is to permit claimant to conduct clinical investigations into 
Neptone's safety and effectiveness. 
Neptone is sold in health food stores and by mail order. Claimant 
advertises in various health food magazines. Since 1980, claimant has also 
promoted Neptone through several brochures, magazine reprints, and a 
scientific paper. These were available on request and were sent to mail 
order customers. FDA Consumer Safety Officer Paul J. Sage was one such 
customer. In general, claimant's advertising extols the green mussel (and 
Neptone) as being high in mucopolysaccharides, which are claimed to help 
prevent diseases commonly associated with aging, such as arthritis and 
hardening of the arteries. 
The Court finds that the claimant's promotional claims clearly 
show that it intended Neptone to be used "in the diagnosis, cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease in man." The so-called "brown 
brochure" is the most flagrant example, but even the so-called "blue 
brochure" claims, among other things, that Neptone helps to repel infec-
tion, prevent blood clots, and maintain the elasticity of the arteries. 
The Court does not view this opinion as establishing for all time that 
Neptone is a drug. The determination that Neptone is a drug rests entirely 
on the pattern of promotion uSed by claimant in the several years immedi-
ately preceding the instant seizure. Should Neptone again be marketed 
after some hiatus and a change in labelling, this order will not necessarily 
work an estoppel on whether that batch of Neptone is a drug.1 The answer 
will turn on the relationship between the future sales and the offensive 
labelling. Clearly, this opinion cannot work any estoppel on the issues of 
misbranding and safety and effectiveness . 
The Court recognizes that not applying collateral estoppel to future 
batches of Neptone might allow it to be marketed without its having been 
established as safe and effective. Fault for this lies with the drafters of this 
statute for conditioning the safety and effectiveness requirements on 
I. This reasoning does not apply to any 
Neptone now in existence that is not current-
ly under the in rem jurisdiction of this Court. 
The Court has found that claimant's pro· 
motions over the past few years reveal Nep-
tone's intended use as a drug. These pro-
motional claims presumably apply to the 
N eptone that was effectively seized as well as 
to the Neptone that was lnot] effectively 
seized. 
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labelling. As noted above, claimant brought the regulatory scheme down 
upon itself through its labelling and promotional brochures; this Court will 
not take the further step of saying that now claimant can never get out 
from under the regulatory scheme . 
.'-'1·1' also In the Matter of Property Seized from International Nutrition, Food Drug 
( :usm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 37, 177 (D. Nev. 1997). 
4. Commentary. For discussion on food and drug classifications, see Roseann 
1{. 'l'ermini, Product Classification Under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act: 
When a Food Becomes a Drug, 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 1 (1993). For a discussion of 
the regulatory boundaries between foods and drugs throughout the world, see Peter 
Mansell, Battling Over the Boundaries, SCRIP MAGAZINE, Oct. 2000, at 71. 
COMMENT: "INTENDED USE" IN THE ABSENCE OF CLAIMS 
Since the decision in Mathews, FDA has rarely asserted its drug or 
device jurisdiction over a product unless the manufacturer or distributor 
has made representations about product's disease or structure/function 
effects. But neither has the agency unequivocally disclaimed its authority 
to establish intended use based on the "circumstances surrounding the 
distribution of the article." 21 C.F.R. 201.128, 21 C.F.R. 801.4. 
The most famous instance in which FDA attempted to declare a 
product to be a drug (or device) in the absence of relevant manufacturer 
claims was its 1996 rulemaking on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. 61 
Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). FDA argued that tobacco products were 
"intended" to affect the structure/function of the body based solely on 
evidence concerning the foreseeable and actual use of the products for 
stimulation, tranquilization, weight control, and satisfaction of nicotine 
addiction and on internal company statements confirming the manufactur-
ers' awareness of these uses. The Supreme Court ultimately denied FDA 
jurisdiction without reaching the "intended use" issue. FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), excerpted infra p. 82. 
Throughout the Brown & Williamson litigation, the tobacco industry 
asserted that no court had ever found that a product was "intended for 
use" or "intended to affect" absent manufacturer claims regarding that 
product's use. This assertion would no longer be true if made today. In 
2001, the United States brought criminal charges against a number of 
individuals for selling unlabeled balloons containing nitrous oxide ("laugh-
ing gas") in a parking lot outside a rock concert. The government alleged 
the defendants were unlawfully distributing misbranded prescription drugs, 
in violation of the FD&C Act. In U.S. v. Travia, 180 F. Supp.2d 115, 119 
(D.D.C. 2001), the District Court rejected the defendants' argument that 
the nitrous oxide they sold was not a "drug" under the FD&C Act because 
they made no representations about its use. Judge Thomas Hogan stressed 
that intent could be determined not only by labeling, promotional claims, 
and advertising, but also by "any other relevant source." He observed, 
"This case is obviously unique in that ... the sellers did not need to label 
or advertise their product, as the environment provided the necessary 
information between buyer and seller. In this context ... the fact that 
there was no labeling may actually bolster the evidence of an intent to sell 
a mind-altering article without a prescription-that is, a misbranded drug." 
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COMMENT: DISEASE CLAIMS FOR FOOD AND 
STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FOR DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 
The definition of "drug" in section 20l(g)(l) of the FD&C Act con-
cludes with the following proviso: 
A food or dietary supplement for which a claim, subject to sections 
403(r)(l)(B) and 403(r)(3) of this title or sections 403(r)(l)(B) and 
403(r)(5)(D) of this title, is made in accordance with the require-
ments of 403(r) of this title is not a drug solely because the label or 
the labeling contains such a claim. A food, dietary ingredient, or 
dietary supplement for which a truthful and not misleading state-
ment is made in accordance with section 403(r)(6) of this title is 
not a drug under clause ( C) solely because the label or the labeling 
contains such a statement. 
This language reflects dramatic changes in the relationship between 
food and drugs made by two important statutes passed in the 1990s: the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) and the Dietary 
Supplement and Health Act of 1994 CDSHEA). The first sentence refers to 
the fact that under the NLEA, a food may, with approval by FDA (or in 
accordance with an authoritative statement by a federal scientific body or 
the National Academy of Sciences), make a claim "which expressly or by 
implication . . . characterizes the relationship of any nutrient to a 
disease or a health-related condition." FD&C Act 403(r)(l)(B). The second 
sentence refers to the fact DSHEA establishes a new subcategory of food 
called "dietary supplements" and allows such products (many of which are 
not "common sense" foods) to make structure and function claims. 
FDA began to permit explicit disease claims (termed "health claims" 
by the agency) on food labels in the 1980s, following the lead of the Federal 
Trade Commission, which started to allow such claims in food advertise-
ments in the 1970s. See infra p. 272. By establishing the NLEA health 
claims regime in 1990, Congress was thus authorizing a lenient regulatory 
approach that FDA had, in broad terms, already embraced. By contrast, 
before the passage of DSHEA, FDA demonstrated a willingness to regulate 
dietary supplements aggressive!¥, particularly through the imposition of 
the FD&C Act's premarket approval requirements for drugs and food 
additives. In short, DSHEA represented an effort by Congress to rein in the 
agency. The regulatory regimes for disease claims and dietary supplements 
are discussed at length, infra p. 284 and p. 246. At this early stage, 
however, it is important to recognize that the desire to subject certain 
classes of products to more or less regulation not only shapes FDA' s 
interpretation of the statutory definitions, but sometimes leads Congress to 
revise the definitions. 
3. "INTENDED UsE" AND THE CosMETIC-DRuG SPECTRUM 
An article may fall under the FD&C Act's definitions of "drug" or 
"medical device" even if it has no therapeutic purpose, so long as it is 
"intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." FD&C Act 
20l(g)(l)(C) and 20l(h). The definitions thus raise the question of how 
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much, and in what way, a non therapeutic product must be intended to alter 
Lhe body to be considered a drug or device. 
Just as an article may be both a "food" and a "drug," a product may 
simultaneously fall within the definitions of "cosmetic" and "drug" and be 
subject to the requirements of both categories. Cosmetics are the least 
intensively regulated of any of the products under FDA' s jurisdiction. The 
agency thus has sometimes reached for greater authority over particular 
cosmetic products by trying to categorize them as new drugs subject to 
premarket review for safety and effectiveness. 
Peter Barton Hutt, Reconciling the Legal, Medical, and 
Cosmetic Chemist Approach to the Definition of a 
"Cosmetic" 
3 CTFA CoSMETrcs JoURl\iAL, No. 3 (1971l. 
The first principle is that the intended use of the product, rather than 
its inherent properties, control[s] its classification. . [T)he controlling 
representations made by the manufacturer may appear in labeling, in 
advertising, or in any other form of oral or written communication. And an 
implicit representation is as controlling as an explicit one .. 
The second general principle is that the representations made for a 
product may properly classify it in more than one product category under 
the Act. If a product were represented both to treat a disease and to 
promote attractiveness, it would properly be classified as both a drug and 
cosmetic, and must meet the legal requirements for both categories .... 
The third, and final, general principle is that it is the initial and 
primary responsibility of the manufacturer or distributor of a product to 
determine the proper classification of his product, and to make certain that 
it meets all applicable legal requirements .... 
Attempting to formulate a hard and fast rule differentiating between 
cosmetic claims and drug claims is virtually impossible. Some cosmetics are 
intended merely to color some part of the body, in order to promote 
attractiveness, and present no problem of proper classification. And on the 
other end of the scale, some products are represented to effect a physiologi-
cal change in the body, and these would clearly fall into the drug category 
as well as the cosmetic category. But in between these two extremes is the 
difficult area of judgment-the cosmetics that claim to promote attractive-
ness through a slight, and usually temporary, physical but not physiologi-
cal, effect upon the skin. 
The Food and Drug Administration attempted to deal with the proper 
legal classification of some of these various types of products in the 
advisory opinions contained in its Trade Correspondence during 1938--1946. 
The difficulty in resolving these matters on a purely rational basis is 
readily demonstrated by just three of those opinions. FDA stated that 
mercury preparations used to bleach or remove tan are drugs because they 
are intended to affect the structure and function of the body. On the other 
hand, an article represented solely to produce an even tan is regarded by 
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FDA as a cosmetic. And a product intended not just to produce an even tan, 
but also to prevent sunburn, is a drug .... 
A further indication of the distinction between a product that does and 
does not affect a bodily structure or function may be found in the area of 
deodorants. A product that absorbs perspiration, or masks its odor, or 
prevents odor by germicidal or bacteriostatic agents that act upon odor-
producing bacteria, is classified by the Food and Drug Administration as a 
cosmetic and not a drug. A product that is designed to reduce perspiration 
odor by reducing the perspiration itself, through a change in the sweat 
glands, is considered by the Food and Drug Administration to be a drug. 
A cosmetic may properly be represented for use to mask or cover up 
the physical manifestations of a disease, without becoming a drug. Acne 
and dandruff are regarded as disease conditions, and any product repre-
sented to treat those conditions is classified as a drug. But products that 
claim merely to cover up manifestations of acne, or to wash away loose 
dandruff flakes, would properly be classified solely as cosmetics. 
An analogous question is presented by "hypoallergenic" cosmetic prod-
ucts, which claim to have "screened out" most irritants. Since hypoaller-
genic foods have not been regarded as drugs it would appear that hypoaller-
genic cosmetics would similarly not be regarded as drugs absent specific 
claims that certain diseases will be treated or relieved by the product .... 
A question frequently asked is whether any inclusion of an active 
ingredient in a cosmetic automatically classifies it as a drug. The answer is 
that classification depends upon the claims made, not upon the inclusion of 
the ingredient itself ... _ 
United States v. An Article ... Sudden Change 
409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969) . 
• ANDERSON. CIRCUIT JUDGK 
This is an appeal in a seizur,. action from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ... granting summary 
judgment for the claimant. The seizure concerned 216 bottles of a cosmetic 
product called "Sudden Change" which is a clear liquid lotion consisting 
primarily of two ingredients: bovine albumen (15%) and distilled water 
(over 84%). It is meant to be applied externally to the surface of the facial 
skin, and it is claimed, inter alia, in its labeling and advertising that it will 
provide a "Face Lift Without Surgery." The court below described the 
effects of the product as follows: 
Allowed to dry on the skin, it leaves a film which ( 1) masks 
imperfections, making the skin look smoother and (2) acts me-
chanically to smooth and firm the skin by tightening the surface. 
Both effects are temporary. There is apparently no absorption by, 
or changes in, skin tissue resulting from its applications; it washes 
off. 
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The central issue presented in this appeal is whether Sudden Change 
1s, within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l), a "drug.". 
It is well settled that the intended use of a product may be determined 
l'rom its label, accompanying labeling, promotional material, advertising 
and any other relevant source. Regardless of the actual physical effect of a 
product, it will be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act where the labeling 
and promotional claims show intended uses that bring it within the drug 
definition. 
The mere statement of this rule poses a crucial issue: by what stan-
dards are these claims to be evaluated? Or, to put it another way, what 
degree of sophistication or vulnerability is to be ascribed to the hypothetical 
potential consumer in order to understand how these claims are understood 
by the buying public?. [W]e conclude that the purposes of the Act will 
best be effected by postulating a consuming public which includes "the 
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous. " 
While it is not altogether clear what standard the court below applied, 
the reasoning appears to assume sometl1ir1g like a "reasonable woman" 
standard. Thus, the District Court assumes that the "constant exposure to 
puffing and extravagant claims" has induced "some immunity in the 
beautifiers' hyperbole" which is such that the court "cannot believe" that 
the potential consumer of Sudden Change "expects anything other than a 
possibility that she may look better." We agree that certain claims which 
arguably would bring the product within § 32l(g)(l)(C) have so drenched 
the potential consumer that even the "ignorant, the unthinking and the 
credulous" must be presumed able to discount their promises as typical of 
cosmetic advertising puffery. We cannot agree, however, with the conclu-
sion that such immunity or skepticism somehow transfers to the promise to 
"lift out puffs" or give a "face lift without surgery." The references to 
"face lift" and "surgery" carry distinctly physiological connotations, sug-
gesting, at least to the vulnerable consumer that the product will "affect 
the structure of the body .. " in some way other than merely 
temporarily altering the appearance. We do not accept the concept that 
skepticism toward familiar claims necessarily entails skepticism toward 
unfamiliar claims; the theory of the legislation is that someone might take 
the claim literally. 
In other words, witb the exception of those claims which have become 
so associated with the familiar exaggerations of cosmetics advertising that 
virtually everyone can be presumed to be capable of discounting them as 
puffery, 10 the question of whether a product is "intended to affect the 
structure of the body of man ... " is to be answered by considering, 
10. We agree that the legislative 
history and the language of the Act require 
rejection of any rule which would convert all 
cosmetics into drugs. We believe, however, 
that the test which we have applied draws 
the necessary line while at the same time 
protecting the public. For example, promises 
that a product will "soften" or "moisturize" 
a woman's skin are so thoroughly familiar 
that constant exposure can be presumed to 
have induced sufficient immunity even in our 
hypothetical vulnerable consumer (this as-
sumes, arguendo, that these promises have 
exactly the same degree of drug-type connota-
tions as the "face lift v.ithout surgery" 
claim-an assumption \Vhich we reject). 
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first, how the claim might be understood by the "ignorant, unthinking or 
credulous" consumer, and second, whether the claim as so understood may 
fairly be said to constitute a representation that the product will affect the 
structure of the body in some medical-or drug-type fashion, i.e., in some 
way other than merely "altering the appearance." 
We hold, therefore, that so long as Sudden Change is claimed to give a 
"face lift without surgery" and to "lift out puffs" it is to be deemed a drug 
within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(C). It should be understood, 
however, that if the claimant ceases to employ these promotional claims 
and avoids any others which may fairly be interpreted as claiming to affect 
the structure of the skin in some physiological, though temporary, way, 
then, assuming arguendo that no actual physical effect exists, the product 
will not be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act. While there may be 
merit in the cause of those who seek to require pretesting of new cosmetics, 
it is not for the courts to legislate such a requirement; rather it must rest 
in the hands of Congress to decide whether such an amendment to the 
statute should be enacted or not .... 
•MANSFIELD, DISTRICT JUDGE (dissenting): .... 
In view of the existence of ample authority for regulation of cosmetics, 
it strikes me as unnecessary, in the absence of some imminent danger to 
public health-and none is suggested here--for the Court to adopt new 
standards of construction for the purpose of determining whether an article 
is intended as a "drug" rather than to follow time-proven rules. Yet that is 
exactly what the Court does here, with the result that it opens up a new-
and in my view, unnecessary-avenue for regulation of cosmetics as drugs. 
If Congress believes that protection of the public requires pretesting and 
clearance of cosmetics by the Food and Drug Administration . . . and that 
their components be listed on the label, it has the power to act. I do not 
think the Court should do so by a process of tortuous construction .... 
It may well be that the existence of fraud upon consumers of such 
products (whether drugs or cosmetics) should depend upon whether "the 
ignorant, the unthinking and credulous" would be deceived. The issue 
before us, however, is not whether consumers may be defrauded by the 
labelling and enclosures userj in connection with the sale of "Sudden 
Change." The issue is whether the product must be classified as a "drug" 
which must be pre-tested, cleared and bear a label listing its components. 
Since that issue turns upon whether the article is "intended to affect the 
structure of the body" (emphasis added), it seems to me that the "gullible" 
woman standard is both irrelevant and unnecessary, and that the standard 
should be whether a reasonable person would construe the labeling and 
advertising as showing that the product was so intended .... 
NOTES 
1. Parallel Cases. In United States v. An Article "Line Away," 415 F.2d 
369 (3d Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the promotional material for a similar 
product attributed drug characteristics to it: 
. . . [T]he repeated statements that Line Away is made in a "pharma-
ceutical laboratory" and packaged under Hbiologically aseptic conditions" 
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i1nply that the product itself is a pharmaceutical. Characterizing the lotion 
as "super-active" and "amazing," creating a "tingling sensation" when "at 
work," "tightening" the skin and "discouraging new wrinkles from form-
ing" strongly reinforces the impression that this is a therapeutic product, 
lhe protein content of which has a tonic or otherwise wholesome physiolog-
ical effect on the skin itself. 
Even the denial that Line Away is a "hormone" or a "harmful 
drug," read in the context of the other representations, suggests that it is a 
harmless drug. 
Some "puffery" may not amount to representation of a cosmetic as a 
drug, but when "puffery" contains the strong therapeutic implications we 
find in the Line Away promotional material, we think the dividing line has 
been crossed. 
But United States v. An Article "Helene Curtis Magic Secret ", 331 F. 
Supp. 912 m. Md. 1971), held that Helene Curtis's very similar wrinkle smoother 
was a cosmetic and not a drug: 
... 'fhe only two claims made for "Magic Secret" which even approach 
the magnitude of the claims made in Line Away and Sudden Change are 
that "Magic Secret" is a "pure protein" which causes an "astringent 
sensation." The promotional material does not emphasize these two claims 
and even the "ignorant, unthinking and credulous" consumer would not be 
led by these references to believe that "Magic Secret" would do other than 
alter their appearance. It is apparent that the promotional claims made for 
"Magic Secret" are less exaggerated than those reported in Line Away and 
Sudden Change. It cannot be said that they carry the same drug connota-
tions as found by the Second and Third Circuits. 
'fhe court concluded that the product's promotional material would lead a prospec-
live purchaser only to expect that she may look better, and not that the structure of 
the body would be affected. See also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1105 
19th Cir. 1994) (endorsing Magic Secret analysis, but concluding that a baldness 
remedy claiming new hair growth was a drug). 
2. Subsequent FDA Actions Regarding Antiwrinkle Products. Beginning in 
April 1987, FDA sent regulatory letters to dozens of cosmetic manufacturers 
alleging that products with "wrinkle remover" claims were illegal new drugs. 
" 'Antiaging' Creams Challenged," FDA Talk Paper No. T87-24 (May 14, 1987). A 
series of meetings and correspondence between an industry coalition and FDA on 
this matter was abruptly terminated on November 19, 1987 by the following 
statement in a letter by the FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs. 
We consider a claim that a product will affect the body in some physiologi~ 
cal way to be a drug claim, even if the claim is that the effect is only 
temporary. Such a clain1 constitutes a representation that the product is 
intended to affect the structure or function of the body and thus makes the 
product a drug under 21 U.S.C. 32l(g)(l)(C). Therefore, we consider most 
of the anti-aging and skin physiology claims that you outline in your letter 
to be drug claims. For example, claims that a product 'counteracts/ 
'retards,' or 'controls' aging or the aging process, as well as claims that a 
product will 'rejuvenate,' 'repair,' or 'renew' the skin, are drug claims 
because they can be fairly understood as claims that a function of the body, 
or that the structure of the body, will be affected by the product. For this 
reason also, all of the examples that you use to allege an effect within the 
epidermis as the basis for a temporary beneficial effect on wrinkles, lines, 
or fine lines are unacceptable. A claim such as 'molecules absorb and 
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expand,' exerting upward pressure to 'lift' wrinkles (upward' is a claim for 
an inner, structural change. 
The Associate Commissioner did offer some guidelines for cosmetic claims: 
While we agree with your statements that wrinkles will not be re~ 
versed or removed by these products ... we would not object to claims that 
products will temporarily improve the appearance of such outward signs of 
aging. The label of such products should state that the product is intended 
to cover up the signs of aging, to improve the appearance by adding color or 
a luster to skin, or otherwise to affect the appearance through physical 
means. 
. . . [W]e would consider a product that claims to improve or to 
maintain temporarily the appearance or the feel of the skin to be a 
cosmetic. For example, a product that claims to moisturize or soften the 
skin is a cosmetic. 
An attempt by one manufacturer to obtain clarification of the dividing line 
between cosmetic and drug claims for these products through a declaratory judg-
ment action was thwarted when the court agreed with FDA's contention that the 
matter was not ripe for judicial review. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1 
(D.D.C. 1989). Individual companies eventually resolved their issues with FDA, and 
the agency ultimately did not bring formal action against any of these products. 
After a lull, FDA has recently resumed taking action against antiwrinkle 
products. It issued warning letters to two manufacturers of skin creams, stating 
that the companies were selling unapproved drugs. See Warning Letters Address 
Claims Made for Topical Skincare Preparations, Office of Cosmetics and Colors 
Press Release (Mar. 1, 2005). The objectionable claims cited by FDA with respect to 
one of these products, Collagen5, included: "Collagen5"' is proven to reduce deep 
wrinkles up to 70%," "Stimulates your skin's own collagen building network," 
"Reduces deep wrinkles from within the skin's surface," and "Visible results that 
won't fade away." Warning Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, Director, Los Angeles 
District, FDA, to University Medical Products USA, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2004). The other 
warning letter cited (among many other statements) the manufacturers' reference 
to "Pal-KTTKS solution's effectiveness at reducing the appearance of fine lines and 
wrinkles.'' Warning Letter from B. Belinda Collins, Director, Denver District Office, 
FDA, to Basic Research, LLC (Jan. 14, 2005). It is unclear why FDA took issue with 
this particular claim; perhaps it objected to the manufacturer's failure to declare 
that the effects were only "tempor~." 
3. Thigh Creams. The warning letters discussed above in Note 2 also informed 
companies that products claiming to combat cellulite, stretch marks, and breast sag 
and shrinkage and to reduce thigh circumference and overall weight were unap-
proved drugs. Warning Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, Director, Los Angeles District, 
FDA, to University Medical Products USA, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2004); Warning Letter 
from B. Belinda Collins, Director, Denver District, FDA, to Basic Research, LLC. 
FDA has suggested that it views all thigh creams promoted for cellulite reduction as 
drugs. See Thigh Creams, Office of Cosmetics and Colors Fact Sheet (Feb. 24, 2000) 
("Thigh creams may more appropriately be classified as drugs under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act since removal or reduction of cellulite affects the 'structure 
or function' of the body.") 
4. Hair Care Products: In United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 
534 (D.R.!. 1994), the U.S. District Court found that the distributor's two hair care 
products were drugs. Although the defendant stated that it never labeled or 
promoted its products as cures for baldness or to prevent hair loss, the court found 
the company was aware that its products were being offered by others to prevent 
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li<tldness. "The promotional materials accompanying Solutions 109 are replete with 
daims (testimonials) that hair growth has occurred and hair loss prevented with 
11:-;e of these products. Therefore, Solutions 109 are intended by Kasz for use in the 
1nitigation, treatment, or prevention of hair loss and are thus drugs. . . " 
In a series of warning letters that FDA began issuing in April 2003, it reminded 
1nanufacturers that hair care products marketed with claims such as restoration of 
hair growth, hair loss pr~vention, and treatment of dandruff are considered drugs, 
not cosmetics. Office of Cosmetics and Colors, Warning Letters Address Hair Care 
Products, Apr. 3, 2003. 
5. FDA's Persistence. FDA continues to challenge, as unapproved drugs, 
numerous products portrayed if not expressly labeled as providing health benefits. 
E.g., United States v. Eighteen Units, More or Less, of " .. ')ports Oxygen," Food Drug 
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 39,025, 5 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ten 
Cartons, More or Less, of an Article Ener-B, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 39,518, 72 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995) (nasal gel containing vitamin B12); Letter from 
Ronald G. Chesemore, FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, to 
Walter E. Byerley (Dec. 26, 1990)(facial tissue impregnated with antibiotic). 
COMMENT: "COSMECEUTICALS" 
FDA scientists recognized very early that all cosmetics penetrate the 
skin and thus affect the body. As one wrote: "[T]here are few if any 
substances which are not ahsorbed through the intact skin, even though 
the idea is prevalent that the skin is a relatively effective barrier to its 
environment." H.O. Calvery, Safeguarding Foods and Drugs in Wartime, 
32 AM. SCIENTIST No. 2, at 103, 119 (1944). There are some skin care 
products marketed as cosmetics, however, that clearly have more signifi-
cant effects on the body than do traditional cosmetics. These products are 
often referred to as "cosmeceuticals." Although the FDA does not itself use 
the term "cosmeceutical," it recognizes that cosmetic manufacturers use 
this word "to refer to cosmetic products that have medicinal or drug-like 
benefits." Office of Cosmetics & Color Fact Sheet, (rev. Feb. 24, 2000). 
When defining "cosmeceutical," the FDA remarked, "If a product has 
drug properties, it must be approved as a drug." Id. This statement is one 
of several instances in which the agency has suggested that the presence of 
an ingredient with pharmacological effects may render a product a drug, 
regardless of the claims made by the manufacturer. In 1996, John Bailey, 
the Director of FDA's Office of Cosmetics and Colors, stated, "If an active 
ingredient is present in a therapeutic concentration, the product is a drug, 
even if that product does not claim to produce the effect that will result 
from the action of the therapeutically effective ingredient." Anita H. Shaw, 
The News in Skin Care, SOAP-CosM.-CHEM. SPECIALTIES. Oct. 1, 1996, at 72. 
The validity of Bailey's statement hinges on whether the agency must, 
in determining "intent," always depend at least in part on claims by the 
manufacturer. As will be discussed infra p. 81, when FDA asserted jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products as medical devices in the 1990s, it vigorously 
maintained that evidence from "other relevant sources" could, on its own, 
establish objective intent. In the world of "cosmeceuticals," this question 
has been raised most frequently with regard to two types of topically 
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applied products: cosmetics containing hormones and cosmetics containing 
alpha hydroxy acids. 
In 1993, FDA proposed a rule declaring that any cosmetic product 
containing more than a specified amount of the hormones pregnenolone 
acetate or progesterone was an unapproved drug, regardless of manufactur-
er claims. The agency observed that, above these amounts, the ingredients 
affected the structure or function of the body. 58 Fed Reg. 47611 (Sept. 9, 
1993). The agency also proposed banning "natural estrogens" from cosmet-
ics altogether, unless manufacturers provided adequate data on the safety 
and exact chemical identity of such estrogens. "[T]he agency concludes at 
this time that any use of natural estrogens in cosmetic products makes the 
product an unapproved new drug. The conclusion is based on available data 
stating conclusively that at some levels the ingredients affect the structure 
or function of the body, and a concomitant lack of data establishing at what 
level, if any, the drug effect ceases." Finally, FDA also proposed that the 
use of the word "hormone" in the labeling or ingredient statement of any 
cosmetic product was an implied drug claim. In 2004, the agency withdrew 
this proposed rule but remarked that "this withdrawal neither affirms nor 
rejects statements contained in the preamble [to the proposed rule]." 69 
Fed. Reg. 68833 (Nov. 26, 2004). Although the rule was never finalized, 
FDA did finalize a drug regulation, proposed simultaneously, providing that 
the use of the word "hormone" in the labeling or ingredient statement of 
any topically applied product is an implied drug claim. 58 Fed. Reg. 4 7610 
(Sept. 9, 1993), codified at 21 C.F.R. 310.530(a). 
Alpha hydroxy acids (AHAs) are chemicals that cause the skin to lose 
its outer layer. Manufacturers of cosmetics containing AHAs claim their 
products will smooth fine lines, reduce spots, and improve skin condition in 
general. In a 1994 speech, FDA official John Bailey stated: "In the final 
analysis, it is well established that AHAs exert an effect on the skin. I don't 
think that there is any doubt that, under some conditions of formulation 
and use, AHA containing products are affecting the structure and function 
of the body and that they should be regulated as drugs." Quoted in 
Jacqueline A. Greff, Regulation of Cosmetics that are also Drugs, 51 Foon 
DRUG CosM. L.J. 243, 257 (1997). Nonetheless, FDA has not, to this point, 
charged a manufacturer with- selling an unapproved drug based solely on 
the fact that the product contains AHAs. It has addressed safety issues 
raised by AHA-containing skin care products based solely on its authority 
over cosmetics. See 70 Fed. Reg. 1721 (Jan. 10, 2005) (announcing availabil-
ity of final guidance advising manufacturers of AHA-containing cosmetics 
to label them so as to alert consumers of the need to limit sun exposure and 
apply sunscreen). For further discussion on AHAs, see Laura A. Heymann, 
The Cosmetic/Drug Dilemma: FDA Regulation of Alpha-Hydroxy Acids, 52 
Foon & DRUG L.J. 357 (1997). 
NOTES 
1. Approved Cosmetic Drugs and Devices. In recent years, FDA has approved 
new drug applications (NDAs) and device premarket approval applications (PMAs) 
for antiwrinkle products. Renova (tretinoin) is a prescription drug approved to 
reduce fine wrinkles) discoloration, and roughness on facial skin. BOTOX Cosmetic 
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1 !~1itulinum Toxin Type A) is a prescription drug approved to treat frown lines 
ln·lween the eyebrows. The agency has approved collagen and hyaluronic acid gel, 
I 1olh injectable antiwrinkle products, as medical devices, as well as lasers making 
: u1tiwrinkle claims. 
The agency has approved NDAs for two types of hair regrowth products: 
H,ogaine (minoxidil), a topical solution, and Propecia (finasteride), a drug in pill 
l'orm. 
2. OTC Drug Review. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) Drug Review is the primary process by which the agency has assessed the 
o;afety and effectiveness of active ingredients in OTC drug products. In this context, 
the relationship between the Act's definitions of "cosmetic" and "drug)' has 
Crequently been at issue. The agency has frequently evaded the question of whether 
a particular use of a substance is solely a cosmetic use or also a drug use by simply 
restricting the use of the substance in both cosmetics and drugs. E.g., 21 C.F.R 
250.250(d) & (cJ (limiting the use of hexacholorophene in OTC drugs and cosmet-
ics). Cf 21 C.F.R. 310.545(a)(l 7) (skin-bleaching OTC drug products containing 
ammoniated mercury are not generally recognized as safe and effective) & 700.13 
(mercury-containing skin-bleaching agents are drugs as well as cosmetics and are 
misbranded and adulterated). For discussions of the various OTC drug monographs 
in which the cosmetic/drug distinction has been considered, see William E. Gilbert-
son, FDA OTC Drugs Standards Versus Cosmetic Standards, 21 DRUG INFO. J. 
379 (1987); Stephen H. McNamara, The Food and Drug Administration Over-the-
Counter Drug Review-Concerns of the Cosmetic Industry, 38 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 
289 (1983). 
COMMENT: DEODORANT PRODUCTS 
FDA's policy for products that deal with body odors seems to have 
evolved recently. Describing a product as a deodorant is indisputably a 
cosmetic claim, and deodorant products that merely mask odor with per-
fumes are clearly cosmetics and not drugs. But what of products that attack 
odors with antimicrobial ingredients? It was long assumed that a mouth-
wash or deodorant soap could make a claim like "kills germs that cause 
odor" without becoming a drug for regulatory purposes. In the early 1990s, 
however, the preambles to the tentative final monographs for various types 
of OTC antiseptic drug products firmly stated that claims of this sort would 
subject a product to regulation as a drug. 56 Fed. Reg. 33644, 33648-49 
(July 22, 1991) (first aid antiseptics); 59 Fed. Reg. 6084, 6088-89 (Feb. 9, 
1994) (oral antiseptics); 59 Fed. Reg. 31402, 31440 (health care antiseptics). 
Importantly, in these preambles, FDA disclaimed any intention to regulate 
deodorant products without such claims as drugs merely because they 
contained antimicrobial ingredients. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33648; 59 Fed. Reg. at 
6088. 
About the same time, FDA initiated a seizure action against a product 
called Pets Smellfree. The agency contended that the product, a pet food 
additive containing a subtherapeutic dose of an antibiotic, was an adulter-
ated and misbranded animal drug. The manufacturer claimed the product 
"stops those awful odors associated with feces, urine, gas and BAD 
BREATH." One advertisement added that Pets Smellfree "will neutralize 
the undesirable mercaptans in the digestive tract without affecting the 
desirable bacterial flora." U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Botti.es of ... 
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"Pets Smellfree", 1991 WL 11666517 (D. Utah 1991). (Mercaptans are 
sulfur-containing organic compounds.) The District Court accepted the 
company's argument that the product was not a drug, but the court of 
appeals reversed. U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Bottles of . . . "Pets 
Smellfree", 22 F.3d 235 (10th Cir. 1994). Interestingly, the Court of 
Appeals did not refer to even one instance in which the manufacturer 
mentioned the product's antibacterial properties. Instead, the court seemed 
to hold that Pets Smellfree could properly be deemed a drug simply because 
of common knowledge that bacterial contamination causes those odors the 
product claimed to stop. Id. 239-40. The Pets Smellfree analysis of the drug 
status of a deodorant product was thus even more expansive than the 
principles FDA enunciated in the human antiseptic drug monographs 
discussed above. But see E.R. Squibb & Sons u. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 682 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (a claim that a product suppresses the growth a fungus in 
the body does not implicate the drug definition's structure-function provi-
sion, in part because "it is questionable whether a drug that acts only upon 
non-human organisms that happen to reside within the human body can 
properly be understood as affecting the 'body of man.' ") 
NOTES 
1. Other Products on the Cosmetic-Drug Line. There are a variety of common 
claims that can turn a product with cleansing or beautifying uses into a drug in 
addition to, or instead of, a cosmetic. A recent article included a list of some 
important examples of this phenomenon, based on decades of FDA literature and 
practice: 
A suntan product is a cosmetic but a sunscreen product is a drug. 
A deodorant is a cosmetic but an antiperspirant is a drug. 
A shampoo is a cosmetic but an antidandruff shampoo is a drug. 
A toothpaste is a cosmetic but an anticaries toothpaste is a drug. 
A skin exfoliant is a cosmetic but a skin peel is a drug. 
A mouthwash is a cosmetic but an antigingivitis mouthwash is a drug. 
A hair bulking product is a cosmetic but a hair growth product is a drug. 
A skin product to hide acne is"a cosmetic but an antiacne product is a drug. 
An antibacterial deodorant soap is a cosmetic but an antibacterial anti-
infective soap is a drug. 
A skin moisturizer is a cosmetic but a wrinkle remover is a drug. 
A lip softener is a cosmetic but a product for chapped lips is a drug. 
Peter Barton Hutt, The Legal Distinction in the United States Between a Cosmetic 
and a Drug, in COSMECEUTICALS' DRUGS vs. COSMETICS 223, 228 (Peter Elsner & 
Howard I. Maibach, eds., 2000). 
Recent developments have reinforced many of these traditional positions taken 
by the agency. With regard to some of these products, however, FDA has manifested 
an inclination to categorize articles containing pharmacologically active ingredients 
as drugs even when their manufacturers make only cosmetic claims. As discussed 
above, the agency has made some moves in this direction with regard to AHA and 
hormone-containing skin care products. Moreover, when issuing its tentative final 
monograph for sunscreen drug products, FDA stated unambiguously that "a prod-
D DRUGS AND DEVJCES 
uct containing a sunscreen ingredient, even when labeled solely as a tanning aid, is 
both intended and understood to be a sunburn preventative. Such a product, 
therefore, is a drug under the act." 58 Fed. Reg. 28194, 28204 (May 12, 1993). At 
the same time that it issued its final sunscreen monograph, 64 Fed. Reg. 27666 
(May 21, 1999), the agency revoked a 1940 official trade correspondence declaring 
that products promoted solely for tanning purposes (as opposed to products intend-
ed to be used as sunburn preventatives) are cosmetics and not drugs. 64 Fed. Reg. 
27798 (May 21, 19991. 
2. lntercenter Agree1nent. To facilitate oversight of products claiming to be 
cosmetics but that also folfill the statutory definition of a drug, CDER and CFSAN 
entered an agreement affording either center the jurisdiction to bring regulatory 
actions relating to such products. See lntercenter Agreement Between the Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research and the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutri-
tion to Assist FDA in I1nple1nenting the Drug and Cosmetic Provisions of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cos1netic Act /Or Products that Purport to be Cosmetics but Meet the 
Statuto1y Definition of a Drug (June 2002). 
3. Conunentary. For additional discussion of the cosmetic-drug spectrum, see 
Arlene Erlebacher, When ls a "Cosmetic" Also a "Drug" Under the Federal Food, 
Drug and Custnetic Act, 27 Foon DRUG CosM. L.J. 740 (1972); Jacqueline A. Greff, 
Regulation of Cosmetics that are also Drugs, 51 Foon & DRUG L.J. 243 (1996); The 
Legal Distinction in the United States Between a Cosmetic and a Drug, Peter Barton 
Hutt, in COSMECEUTICAL~: DRUGS vs. COSMETICS 223 (Peter Elsner et al., eds. 2000); 
Vincent A. Kleinfeld, "Cos1netic" or "Drug"-The Minotaur's Labyrinth, 22 FOOD 
DRUG CosM L.J. 376 (1967); Bryan A. Liang and Kurt M. Hartman, It's Only Skin 
Deep: FDA Regulation of Skin Care Cosmetics Claims, 8 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 
249 (1999); Stephen H. McNamara, Performance Claims for Shin Care Cosmetics, 
41 Foon DRUG Cosr-.t L.J. 151 (1986); Symposium on the Cosmetic-Drug Distinction, 
21 DHUG INFO. J. 377 (1987). 
COMMENT: OTHER TYPES OF DRUGS WITH NONTHERAPEUTIC 
USES 
Lethal Products. In United States u. Beuthanasia D Regular, Food 
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCHJ ~ 38,265 CD. Neb. 1979), the court upheld an 
FDA seizure of products intended for euthanasia of animals, rejecting the 
company's argument that the products were not drugs and thus were 
outside the jurisdiction of the FD&C Act. Two years later, FDA rejected a 
petition to assert jurisdiction over the use of approved pharmaceuticals by 
state prison officials to execute prisoners sentenced to death. Letter from 
FDA Commissioner A.H. Hayes, Jr., to D.E. Kendall, FDA Dkt No. 80P-
0513 (July 7, 1981). The Supreme Court ultimately held that the agency's 
refusal to take enforcement action in this instance was unreviewable. 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
Drugs of Abuse. Prior to 1970, federal control of narcotic drugs, 
marijuana, and other drugs used for recreational and nonmedical purposes 
was shared among several agencies and rested on a haphazard cluster of 
laws enacted since 1900. For example, FDA was responsible for enforce-
ment of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 226, to 
prevent abuse of depressant and stimulant drugs that also have legitimate 
medical uses, such as amphetamines and barbiturates. 
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In 1970, Congress repealed the earlier statutes and enacted a new 
comprehensive law, the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242, 
codified in 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of 
substances with strong potential for abuse, calibrated according to their 
degree of danger. Responsibility for enforcement of the distribution con-
trols of the Controlled Substances Act rests with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) of the Department of Justice. DEA has the obli-
gation to consult with FDA on the scheduling of controlled substances. 
FDA's recommendations on scientific and medical matters are binding, and 
DEA may not schedule a drug if FDA recommends against it. Moreover, 
FDA regulates the legitimate medical uses of scheduled substances the 
same way it regulates other drugs. Schedule I drugs-that is, illegal drugs 
with no approved medical use, such as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana-are 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of DEA. 
Street Drug Alternatives. The FDA considers products manufactured, 
marketed, or distributed as alternatives to illicit street drugs to be unap-
proved new drugs. FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH. Gum-
ANCE FOR INDUSTRY; STREET DRUG ALTERNATIVES (2000). Street drug alternatives 
are often labeled as dietary supplements containing botanicals, vitamins, 
and minerals. They are marketed with claims implying that they mimic the 
effects of controlled substances. In United States u. Undetermined Quanti-
ties of Articles of Drug, 145 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D. Md. 2001). The district 
court concluded that the defendants' products, comprising a variety of 
herbs, were not dietary supplements. Instead, it found them to be unap-
proved new drugs because the labeling and promotional claims, including a 
catalog explicitly stating the products were "for mood enhancement," 
showed that the manufacturers intended these products to affect the 
function of the mind. 
Oxygen Bars. Establishments known as "oxygen bars" first became 
popular in the late 1990s. These businesses offer customers the opportunity 
to sniff purified oxygen through a plastic hose inserted into their nostrils. 
The oxygen is sometimes "flavored" with aromatic solutions. Oxygen bar 
patrons variously believe that this practice reduces stress, increases energy 
and alertness, reduces headaches. and hangover symptoms, and generally 
relaxes the body. Oxygen has legltimate uses as a medical gas, of course, 
and FDA regulates it as a prescription drug. Although oxygen bar propri-
etors are careful not to make medical claims, FDA has declared that any 
type of oxygen administered for breathing is a prescription drug, regardless 
of its labeling. Nevertheless, the agency has chosen to exercise its adminis-
trative discretion and leave the regulation of oxygen intended for recre-
ational use to the states. See Oxygen Bars: Is a Breath of Fresh Air Worth 
It?, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 9. 
4. THE "DEVICE" DEFINITION 
a. COSMETIC DEVICES 
The section above on the cosmetic-drug spectrum discussed the cate-
gorization of products intended to cleanse, beautify, or promote attractive-
ness. Some articles intended for cosmetic use operate through physical, 
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rather than chemical, action and thus raise similar issues with respect to 
the device definition. As with cosmetic drugs, the question of whether a 
cosmetic device is a "device" under the FD&C Act hinges on how much, 
and in what way, the article is "intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body." FD&C Act 20l(h)(3). 
FDA does not consider most nonmechanical household cosmetic imple-
ments to be "devices" under the Act. The following products, for example, 
fall outside the device requirements unless they make medical claims: 
toothpicks, hair brushes, combs, nail files, nail clippers, nail scissors, 
razors, tweezers, and loofah sponges (used to exfoliate the skin). On the 
other hand, FDA regulates breast implants and chin prostheses as medical 
devices, regardless of whether they are intended to be used for reconstruc-
tive or cosmetic purposes. 21 C.F.R. 878.3530, 3540, 3550. In addition, the 
agency treats collagen used to correct wrinkles and acne scars as a medical 
device, defined as "dermal collagen implants for aesthetic use." See PMA 
Approval for CosmoDerm 1 Human-Based Collagen, CosmoDerm 2 Hu-
man-Based Collagen, and CosmoPlast Human-Based Collagen (Mar. 11, 
2003). FDA also treats tanning lamps, epilators (used for hair removal), 
and tongue scrapers (used to treat bad breath) as medical devices. 21 C.F.R. 
878.5350 ("needle-type epilator"); 878.5360 ("tweezer-type epilator"); 
868.4635 ("ultraviolet lamp for tanning"); 872.6855 ("manual toothbrush-
es/' which is how FDA categorizes tongue scrapers). 
Decorative contact lenses are products that do not correct vision but 
change the apparent color of the iris, seem to add a design to it, or give the 
eye a nonhuman or otherwise abnormal appearance. They present the same 
significant risks of eye injury that corrective contact lenses do. Corrective 
contact lenses are regulated as prescription medical devices, and it had long 
been assumed that noncorrective lenses were devices, as well. In 2002, 
however, Daniel Troy, the FDA Chief Counsel, informed the agency's 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) that he was consider-
ing declaring that noncorrective decorative contact lenses are not medical 
devices. Megan Garvey, Health Concerns Tinge Use of Cosmetic Lenses, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at 1. 'l'his information motivated California Congress-
man Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, to write the following 
letter to Tommy Thompson, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Tommy 
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services 
AUf,,'USt 26, 2002. 
I am writing to alert you to a plan apparently set in motion by the 
Chief Counsel of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to reclassify 
colored contact lenses that do not correct vision as cosmetics instead of 
medical devices, essentially deregulating these products. Under current 
law, manufacturers of colored lenses must meet federal standards of 
hygiene and sterility and can sell their products only with a prescription. 
FDA' s new plan, however, would eliminate these rules, make colored lenses 
available over-the-counter without adequate directions for safe use, and 
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depend on an underfunded cosmetics enforcement division with limited 
safety authority to protect consumers. It would also establish a precedent 
that could lead to the deregulation of many more potentially hazardous 
prescription drugs and devices. 
Because poor-quality or misused contact lenses can cause severe eye 
infections, painful corneal disease, and even blindness, the FDA plan 
virtually guarantees serious medical complications. . . . Ophthalmologists 
and optometrists find no justification to treat colored lenses differently 
from corrective contact lenses. I urge you to intervene personally and stop 
what is a legally unsound and medically dangerous policy. 
Contact lenses all qualify as medical devices under the third part of the 
[medical device definition at section 201(h)], as a product that is "intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man." Lenses 
unavoidably alter the structure of the body by profoundly altering the 
biology of the eye. As one leading ophthalmology textbook states: 
A contact lens may be considered to be an optical patch and 
bandage. As a patch it reduces the availability of oxygen to and the 
dissipation of carbon dioxide from the cornea. As a bandage :t 
creates pressure on the underlying tissues and reduces wetting of 
the ocular surface and dissipation of material from between the 
contact lens and the cornea. 
These effects are unavoidable and foreseeable. Any manufacturer of contact 
lenses that intends for users to place the products in the eye must also 
intend for these effects to occur. 
This longstanding and fair reading of the law, however, has apparently 
been rejected by the Chief Counsel of FDA, Daniel Troy. Mr. Troy appears 
to believe that a product is only a "medical device" if it is marketed 
expressly as something that will affect the structure or function of the 
body. His argument seems to be that since colored noncorrective contact 
lenses are not marketed as something to correct a problem (like poor 
vision), these products cannot be classified as medical devices. 
This reasoning is both wrong and dangerous. It is wrong because of 
legislative history, administrative precedent, and legal precedent, including 
cases in which courts have acknowledged FDA's ability to regulate products 
on the basis of evidence other than express marketing claims. Indeed, two 
such cases have expressly found that colored noncorrective contact lenses 
are medical devices. It is dangerous because of its logical consequence. If a 
medical device or a drug (which is defined using similar terms) must be 
expressly marketed as a treatment to fall under the FDCA, then manufac-
turers can simply use their marketing claims to evade regulation altogeth-
er. Breast implants and collagen injections marketed for aesthetic appeal 
and condoms marketed for pleasure would not be medical devices. Botox 
marketed for cosmetic purposes would not be a drug. A company might 
even attempt to market valium as "fun" to evade drug regulation .... 
NOTES 
L Subsequent Events. In April 2003, FDA officially stated that it considered 
noncorrective decorative contact lenses to be cosmetics, but not devices. See Guin-
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ANCE FOR FDA STAFF ON SAMPLING OR DETENTION WITHOUT PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF 
DECORATIVE CONTACT LENSES (Import Alert 86-10); 68 Fed. Reg. 16520, 16521 (Apr. 
4, 2003). Subsequently, Rep. Waxman-with support from the major manufacturers 
of colored lenses, advocacy organizations dedicated to eye health and safety, and eye 
health professionals-cosponsored legislation requiring FDA to regulate decorative 
contact lenses as medical devices. In November 2005, Congress amended the FD&C 
Act by adding new subsection 520(n), "Regulation of Contact Lens (sic] as Devices." 
This new provision provides: "All contact lenses shall be deemed to be devices 
under section 20HhJ." 119 Stat. 2119. It also, however, declares: "Paragraph (1) 
shall not be construed as bearing on or being relevant to the question of whether 
any product other than a contact lens is a device as defined by section 20l(h) or a 
drug as defined by section 201(g)." 
2. Are Contact Lenses "Cosnietics"? As discussed above, supra p. 39, there are 
valid questions as to whether contact lenses fit the definition of "cosmetic." 
b. DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES 
The device definition includes articles (including "in vitro reagents") 
"intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions." FD&C 
Act 201(h). This provision raises its own interpretive problems. 
United States of America v. 25 Cases, More or Less, of 
an Article of Device ... "Sensor Pad for Breast Self-
Examination" 
942 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1991) . 
• CUDAHY, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
In this case we are called on to interpret the word "device" as used in 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 32l(h)(2) (1988) (the 
Act). The government brought this action to seize the appellant's invento-
ry, believing it to consist of adulterated devices in interstate commerce. The 
district court granted summary judgment for the government .. 
In the mid-1980s, Earl Wright developed a product which he believed 
would aid women in conducting self-examinations for the early detection of 
breast cancer. This product, descriptively named the "Sensor Pad," con-
sists of a flat, circular latex bag filled with a layer of silicone lubricant. It is 
intended to be placed over the breast during self-examinations to improve 
the woman's ability to feel abnormalities beneath the skin. Wright and his 
associates believed the Pad was not a "device" under the Act .. 
According to the Act, the term device "means an instrument, appara-
tus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other 
similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory i 
which is (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of dis-
ease. . " 21 U.S.C. § 32l(h). Although agreeing that its Pad aids in 
the detection and screening of breast cancer, Inventive Products neverthe-
less argues that the word diagnosis does not encompass the function of the 
Sensor Pad. Diagnosis, the appellant suggests, includes only examinations 
to "determine the nature and circumstances of a diseased condition." 
Because the Sensor Pad merely helps the woman in detecting abnormalities 
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that could be symptoms of a disease, strictly speaking it is used before 
actual diagnosis. 
The distinction appellant attempts to draw between screening and 
diagnosis is an untenable one. In its opening brief, Inventive Products 
appears to argue that diagnosis occurs only at the last step in the process of 
discovering a disease, that step which ultimately determines the nature and 
circumstances of a diseased condition. Thus, because the Sensor Pad only 
detects irregularities which may or may not be cancerous growths, it does 
not diagnose the disease. Indeed appellant agrees with one of its expert 
physicians, who averred that ''biopsy is the only means of diagnosing breast 
cancer." By proposing that medical inquiries change from screening to 
diagnosis only at the final determination, the appellant's theory would 
apparently exclude even a mammography unit from being classified as 
diagnostic, because it too cannot confirm the presence of cancer .... 
The obscurity of the line appellant would draw between diagnosis and 
screening ... well illustrates the arbitrariness of the line-drawing. Pursu-
ing this fruitless inquiry is irrelevant in any event since we believe 
Congress had no such screening/diagnosing distinction in mind when it 
wrote section 32l(h). 
The current description of "device" in the Act was adopted essentially 
in the original version of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938), the development of which is discussed in United States v. 
Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 793-98 (1969). The bill 
emerged from committee in the Senate with several amendments, one of 
which proposed broadening the definition of "device" to include tools used 
in diagnosis of disease. At that time one senator, with the voiced approval 
of the bill's sponsor, summarized the amendment on the floor of the 
chamber: "the word 'diagnosis' merely adds to their uses, namely, their use 
in looking into a situation prior to the time when the cure or mitigation 
shall begin." 79 Cong. Rec. 4843 (1935) (statement of Sen. Barkley). 
Another senator meanwhile offered the view that weight scales used during 
the diagnosis of a patient would come within the bill's regulation. Id. 
(statement of Sen. Clark). r 
Moreover, even if Congress' intentions with regard to the scope of 
"diagnosis" were not clear from its debate, the FDA's position in this 
matter would still prevail. It would be entirely plausible to suggest that 
Congress intended the FDA to decide for itself which devices are used for 
diagnosing disease. One senator opined on the floor of the Senate that "the 
language [of the bill] is broad enough to cover any device of which the Food 
and Drug Bureau of the Agricultural Department chooses to take jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 4841. Such a delegation to the FDA would require a court to 
give considerable deference to the agency's decision .... 
Second, even had Congress never considered the question before us, we 
might allow the FDA room to decide the question itself. Courts often will 
defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision 
within the agency's own organic statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) .... 
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Our approach in this case has been further reinforced by the Supreme 
Court, which reminded litigants that "remedial legislation such as the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent 
with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public health .... " Bacto-
Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798. A broad definition of "diagnosis" allows for 
greater authority in the agency to oversee developments in health care, and 
thus to better protect the public health. 
For each of the above reasons, the district court was correct to grant 
the government's motion for summary judgment in this case .. 
NOTES 
1. Diagnostic Drugs. The definition of "drug" at FD&C Act 20l(g)(l) includes 
"articles intended for use in the diagnosis of disease." Unlike the definition of 
"device," this provision does not embrace products intended for the diagnosis of 
;'conditions" other than diseases. Since 1976, FDA has regulated almost all diagnos-
tic products (whether for diseases or "other conditions") as medical devices. See 
infra p. 983. 
2. "Diagnosis" for What Purpose? FDA regulates as devices "OTC test sample 
collection systems for drugs of abuse testing." These products, according to the 
regulation, are intended to "[cjollect biological specimens (such as hair, urine, 
sweat, or saliva), outside of a medical setting and not on order of a health care 
professional (e.g., in the home, insurance, sports, or workplace setting); maintain 
the integrity of such specimens during storage and transport in order that the 
matter contained therein can be tested in a laboratory for the presence of drugs of 
abuse or their metabolites; and provide access to test results and counseling." 21 
C.F.R. 864.3260. VVhen it finalized this regulation, FDA rejected a comment which 
asserted that kits for detecting drugs of abuse in hair are not medical devices under 
section 201(h) of the FD&C Act because they are not for medical diagnosis and 
treatment. 65 Fed. Reg. 18230, 18232 (Apr. 7, 2000). 
In U.S. u. Undetermined Numbe1· of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 
1994), the Tenth Circuit held that containers used to collect urine and saliva 
specimens for HP/ testing were devices, even though the laboratory-defendant that 
distributed the containers performed the testing for insurance risk-assessment 
purposes rather than for medical treatment. 
c. LIMITS OF THE DEVICE DEFINITION 
COMMENT: COMMON SENSE LIMITATIONS ON THE 
DEFINITION OF "DEVICE"? 
FDA's 1996 tobacco rulemaking raised fascinating issues concerning 
the definitions of "device" and "drug," which were explored at length in 
the preambles to the proposed and final rules. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug. 
16, 1995); 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). We have already mentioned 
FDA's expansive approach to establishing the "intended use" of cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco in the absence of representations by the manufac-
turers. Supra p. 47. Another important interpretive issue was whether 
there are unstated common sense limitations on the categories of ''drug' i 
and "device" as defined by the FD&C Act. 
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As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, courts use a "common 
sense" approach in interpreting the FD&C Act's definition of "food." The 
circular brevity of that definition leaves them with little other choice. By 
contrast, the more detailed definitions of "drug" and "device" are less 
obvious candidates for the imposition of implied limitations. However, the 
plain language of these definitions encompasses an enormous range of 
products not traditionally viewed as being within FDA's authority. This is 
particularly true of the definition of "device," which embraces products 
that do not act primarily through chemical action or metabolization. As the 
tobacco manufacturers pointed out repeatedly in attacking FDA's jurisdic-
tion over its products, the device definition, applied literally, would include 
guns and ammunition, thermal pajamas, air conditioners, scuba diving 
gear, automobile airbags, and roller coasters. The industry thus argued 
that a product could be treated as a device only if its intended effects on 
structure or function were "therapeutic," "medical," or "beneficial." See 
61 Fed. Reg. 44619, 44674-75 (Aug. 28, 1996). FDA emphatically opposed 
reading such limitations into the statute. The agency also observed that, in 
any event, tobacco products achieve their effects pharmacologically and are 
thus indistinguishable from products that the agency has traditionally 
regnlated as drugs and devices. Id. at 44675-85. 
The federal district court hearing the challenge to the tobacco rule 
rejected the industry's argument that the structure/function provisions 
must be construed narrowly to avoid absurd implications for other types of 
products. The court remarked that a statute's scope "is not to be judicially 
narrowed ... by envisioning extreme possible applications." Coyne Beahm 
u. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1393 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting U.S. v. Sullivan, 
332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948)). Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court ruled 
for the tobacco industry without reaching the issue of the precise meaning 
of "affect the structure or any function of the body." FDA u. Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (infra p. 82). Consequently, whether there 
are any unstated limits on the definition of "device" remains an open 
question. In the following 2002 letter, FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troy-
who had represented Brow!l & Williamson in its challenge to the agency's 
regulation of cigarettes-firmly embraced the notion that the device defini-
tion encompasses consumer J'l!'Oducts only if they are marketed with claims 
of therapeutic or medical utility. He also advanced a narrow interpretation 
of what types of evidence can establish "intended use." 
Letter from Daniel E. Troy, FDA Chief Counsel, to 
Jeffrey N. Gibbs 
October 17, 2002. 
. . . This responds to your letters concerning Applied Digital Solutions 
(ADS)'s two separate written requests submitted to the Center for Devices 
and Radiological Health under Section 513(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) requesting a determination that the Veri-
Chip is not a medical device under the FD&C Act for the intended uses 
described in the requests. Your requests cover two different intended uses 
of the product. The first is for use of the VeriChip in health information 
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applications ("health information VeriChip"). The second is for security, 
financial, and personal identification\safety applications ("personal ID\secu-
1·ity VeriChip"). For the reasons discussed below, FDA believes that the 
health information VeriChip is a medical device subject to FDA's jurisdic-
tion. FDA agrees, however, that the personal ID/security VeriChip is not 
covered by the FD&C Act. 
Background 
Since 1986, Digital Angel Corporation, which is working with VeriChip 
Corporation, has sold more than 20 million implantable RFID transponders 
for animals. . . . The transponders provide access to information necessary 
to identify the animal. 
In January of 1984, the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) within 
FDA issued a letter to the manufacturer of this product stating: ". . . The 
device does not have a medical\therapeutic function. Therefore, we have no 
objection to marketing of this identification device for use in animals." ... 
ADS has determined to market in the United States a version of the 
microminiature transponder, known by the trade name "VeriChip," for a 
variety of uses in human beings. We understand from ADS that the 
VeriChip is a microminiature transponder that is encapsulated in medical 
grade glass that may be inserted by hypodermic needle under the skin of 
the upper arm in humans. The chip\transponder stores a unique identifica-
tion number only. A small, handheld introducer is used to place the chip 
subcutaneously. A small, handheld battery-powered scanner can read the 
identification number on the chip. That number enables access to a 
database. The personal\security VeriChip would allow access, via the 
database, to information related to security, financial, and personal safety 
applications only. You have represented that it will not contain any medical 
information. By contrast, ADS and its representatives have explained, the 
health information VeriChip would allow access, via the database, to 
medical history and other information to assist medical personnel in 
diagnosing or treating an injury or illness. 
Regulatory Status of the VeriChip 
We believe that the health information product, which facilitates access 
to information for use by medical professionals in treating the individual 
with the VeriChip embedded in his or her arm, is "intended for use in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure [or] mitigation of 
disease." The information in the database is meant to be used by medical 
professionals in diagnosing a disease or other condition. Indeed, the entire 
purpose of this product is for a medical professional to employ when 
treating a stricken individual. For example, information about whether the 
person is allergic to a particular medicine, or has an implanted pacemaker, 
which is accessed in connection with the VeriChip, is intended for use in 
treating the person. Accordingly, FDA has determined that the health 
information VeriChip is a medical device within the meaning of Section 
20l(h)(2) of the FD&C Act. 
By contrast, as CVM recognized with respect to the use of the VeriChip 
predecessor in animals, it does not appear that the personal ID/security 
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VeriChip is a medical device, even though it is an "implant." It is of course 
true that virtually any product that comes into contact with the body-and 
many that do not-could be said to have an effect on the structure or a 
function of the body. However ... FDA's medical device jurisdiction under 
Section 20l(h)(2) extends only to such products that are marketed by their 
manufacturers or distributors with claims of effects on the structure or a 
function of the body. In the language of the statute itself, the product must 
be "intended to" affect the structure or a function of the body. It is well 
settled that intended use is determined with reference to marketing 
claims .... 
In [its brief in) a 1994 case, FDA stated that it "does not claim that a 
device which has no medical application could 'qualify as a device under the 
FD&CA.'" Courts have held that Section 20l(h)(3) only encompasses 
products claimed to affect the body "in some medical-or drug-type fash-
ion, i.e., in some way other than merely altering the appearance." An 
Article ... "Sudden Change," 409 F.2d at 742 (emphasis added). 
The pertinent legislative history supports this interpretation. Specifi-
cally, the Senate Report accompanying the legislation that became the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 states: 
The use to which the product is to be put will determine the 
category into which it will fall. . . . The manufacturer of the 
article, through his representations in connection with its sale, can 
determine the use to which the article is to be put. 
S. Rep. No. 74-361, at 240 (1935) (emphasis added) .. 
Accordingly, assuming that no medical claims are made for the person-
al ID\security VeriChip, and the product marketed for that purpose con-
tains no health information, FDA can confirm that it is not a medical 
device. 
It is, of course, foreseeable that any implant, such as the personal 
ID\security VeriChip, will have an effect on the structure and function of 
the body; indeed, it will be permanently embedded under a person's skin. 
However, as the Fourth Circuit recently held, a foreseeable effect on the 
structure or function of the body does not establish an intended use. If the 
foreseeability theory had been accepted by the courts, FDA would have won 
several cases that it lost. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. 
Mathews, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Also, if foreseeability were a permissible basis for finding an intended 
use as that term is used in Section 20l(h)(3), FDA's jurisdiction would 
encompass many articles having foreseeable physical effects. Yet FDA only 
regulates products if they are marketed with claims of medical or therapeu-
tic utility. For example, FDA only regulates exercise equipment as a 
medical device when it is marketed with claims to prevent, treat, or 
rehabilitate injury or disability. Otherwise, it is a consumer product. 
In addition, if foreseeable effects were cognizable under Section 
20l(h)(3), FDA's legal authority would intrude into consumer product 
regulation-an area of responsibility delegated by Congress to another 
federal agency. CPSC's jurisdiction extends to "consumer products," which 
means "any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) 
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f"or sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary 
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the 
personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a 
permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or 
otherwise .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l). The definition expressly excludes 
··drugs, devices, or cosmetics (as such terms are defined in sections 20l(g), 
I h), and (i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . )." Id. 
~ 2052(a)(l)(H). 
Similarly, if Section 20l(h)(3) of the FD&C Act were interpreted to 
give FDA jurisdiction over any product foreseeably having an effect on the 
structure or a function of the body, then regulatory authority would shift 
from the CPSC to FDA for a host of non-health-related products. Hiking 
boots; shirts, pants, and coats; exercise equipment; insulated gloves; air-
bags; and chemical sprays can be said to affect bodily structure or function. 
Clothing and gloves, for example, keep the body warm. 
NOTES 
1. Subsequent Regulatory Treatment. Because no product similar to the health 
information VeriChip was in commercial circulation prior to the 1976 enactment of 
the Medical Device Amendments, FDA automatically classified it into class III in 
2004, when the agency received premarket notification under section 510(k). 
Immediately thereafter, however, FDA received a reclassification petition from 
Digital Angel, requesting that the device be placed in class II. FDA granted this 
petition in October 2004. Letter from Donna Bea-Tillman, FDA-CDER, to James 
Santelli {Oct. 12, 2004). Accordingly, the agency then promulgated a new classifica-
tion regulation for the class 11 ''Implantable radiofrequency transponder system for 
patient identification and health information." 21 C.F.R. 880.6300. The rule identi-
fies a guidance document as the special control for the device. 
2. "Behind-the-Wall" Medical Gas Pipeline Systems. Most hospitals and many 
other health care facilities have permanently installed medical gas pipeline systems 
as part of their architectural infrastructure. These systems deliver medical gases 
such as oxygen and nitrous oxide fl:om remote tanks to wall outlets throughout the 
facility. Medical gases are prescription drugs, and medical gas delivery products on 
the patients' side of the wall {such as flowmeters, gauges, tubing, and masks) are 
indisputably devices. But what about the "behind-the-wall" pipes, manifolds, valves, 
and connectors, typically installed by plumbing contractors? J:t"'DA originally took the 
position that such systems were "part of the physical plant" rather than medical 
devices. See Letter from 'Franklin K. Coombs, P.E., Biomedical Engineering Branch, 
Division of Classification and Scientific Classification, FDA to Larry R. Pilot, 
Director of the Division of Compliance, FDA (Jan. 3, 1977); Memorandum from 
Pilot to Coombs \Jan. 10, 1977) (response confirming that oxygen supply systems 
"are not devices as that term is defined in the Act"). More recently, however, the 
agency has indicated that medical gas delivery distribution systems are in fact 
devices under the statute. Letter from Eugene M. Berk, Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health, FDA, to Howard Holstein (May 11, 1993). Nevertheless, FDA 
has said it will use its regulatory discretion to exempt such systems from the legal 
requirements for devices, with the exception of the general misbranding and 
adulteration regulations, which still apply. 
3. Leeches and Maggots. FDA treats maggots and leeches marketed for medici~ 
nal purposes as medical devices. Maggots, or fly larvae, are normally associated with 
corpses and adulterated food, but they also help heal wounds and burns in living 
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patients' tissue by liquefying dead tissue. Leeches, the bloodsucking aquatic animals 
with cameo roles in the films The African Queen and Stand By Me, have been used 
in medicine for thousands of years. Today, doctors use them primarily to remove 
pooled blood in skin grafts and reattachment surgery. In 2004, FDA cleared 
separate 510(k) applications to market each of these products as a medical device 
substantially equivalent to a device sold prior to the enactment of the Medical 
Device Amendments in 1976. See FDA Talk Paper, No. T04-19 (June 28, 2004). 
4. Sterilizers. Federal courts have held that machines used to sterilize other 
medical devices are themselves medical devices. See United States v. 22 Rectangular 
or Cylindrical Devices . "The Ster-0-Lizer MD-200'', 714 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Utah 
1989) (surgical instruments); United States u. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(dental handpieces). 
COMMENT: DUAL USE PRODUCTS 
FDA has set forth the following policy for products that have both 
medical and nonmedical uses. 
FDA will regulate a multi-purpose product as a medical device if it 
is intended for a medical purpose . . . FDA will determine the 
intended use of a product based upon the expressions of the person 
legally responsible for its labeling and by the circumstances sur-
rounding its distribution. The most important factors the agency 
will consider in determining the intended use of a particular 
product are the labeling, advertising, and other representations 
accompanying the product. Products that have medical uses only 
are clearly intended for medical purposes, and, therefore, will be 
regulated as medical devices whether or not medical claims are 
made for them. 
45 Fed. Reg. 60576, 60579 (Sept. 12, 1980). 
FDA has taken the position that exercise equipment used in recreation-
al and sporting activities will be regulated as medical devices only where 
those products are intended for medical purposes and thus are properly 
classified as "therapeutic equipment." 48 Fed. Reg. 53032, 53043-44 (Nov. 
23, 1983). Similarly, the agency has concluded that "electrostatic air 
~ 
cleaners are not inherently medical devices," because they have other uses 
as well, and that the fact that FDA regulates the emission of ozone from 
medical devices in 21 C.F.R. § 801.415 does not mean that all products 
emitting ozone are medical devices. Letter from FDA Chief Counsel R.M. 
Cooper to CPSC Assistant General Counsel S. Lemberg (May 14, 1979). 
FDA considers magnets marketed with medical claims, including treat-
ment of cancer or arthritis, to be medical devices. CDRH Consumer 
Information (Mar. 1, 2000). Similarly, the FDA website states that the 
agency considers clothes that are labeled or promoted as providing protec-
tion against the sun or limiting exposure to the sun's UV A/UVB rays to be 
medical devices. FDA imposed unapproved device status on an electric gas 
grill igniter advertised to relieve various kinds of pain when used to send 
an electric current into acupressure points on the body. A federal appeals 
court upheld this determination. U.S. v. Universal Management Services, 
Inc., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999). 
d. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS 
United States v. 23 ... Articles 
192 F.2d 308 i2d Cir. 1951) . 
• WOODBURY. CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
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The United States of America filed a libel seeking the seizure and 
condemnation of certain phonograph records, and various accompanying 
items of p1inted and graphic matter, all of which were moving or had 
moved in interstate commerce. The phonograph records were entitled in 
part "Time To Sleep," and their accompanying literature consists of (1) an 
album in part entitled, "De Luxe Records Presents Time To Sleep a Tested 
Method of Inducing Sleep Conceived and Transcribed by Ralph Slater," (2) 
a leaflet in part reading: "Sleep Witb This Amazing Record 'Time to 
Sleep,' " 13) a certificate entitled "Sleep Guaranteed,'' (4) display cards 
entitled "De Luxe Records Presents Time to Sleep,'' and (5) a poster 
headed "A 'Dream Girl' Shows a New Way to Dreamland." 
Section 20l(h) of the Act under consideration provides in material part 
that "[t]he term 'device' means instruments, apparatus, and contri-
vances, including their components, parts, and accessories, intended (1) for 
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in 
man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the 
body of man or other animals." 
Certainly a phonograph record, if not itself an instrument or an 
apparatus, is a contrivance. And moreover, it is without question a compo-
nent, part or accessory of a phonograph, or like record playing machine, 
which in its turn is without any doubt at all an instrument, apparatus or 
contrivance. The real question therefore is whether the libeled records were 
intended for either of the uses described in (1) or (2) of § 20l(h), supra. 
Obviously the records were intended for use in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment or perhaps prevention of insomnia. But the medical experts who 
testified at the trial were agreed that insomnia is not a disease, but is a 
symptom of a disease, usually although not necessarily a neurological one, 
or of an emotional disturbance of some kind. Thus it may be argued that 
the records do not fall within the coverage of (1) above. 
However, all the expert witnesses who testified on the point were 
unanimous that sleep is a function of the body, or body and mind, of man 
and other animals, and this testimony brings the records within the terms 
of (2), supra, for their intended use was to affect that function, i.e. to 
induce sleep in those who needed it but had difficulty in obtaining enough. 
Without further laboring the point it will suffice to say that the records 
involved are "devices within the meaning of § 20l(h)(2) of the Act .... " 
United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Article of 
Device 
Med. Devices Rep. (CCHl fl 15,055 (W.D. Mich. 1982). 
This is an action by the United States 
and forfeiture of thirty-two different tape 
. . seeking the condemnation 
recordings, marketed by the 
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claimant, Potentials Unlimited, Inc. under various titles. These tape record-
ings were initially seized, pursuant to warrant, on January 6, 1981. The 
tapes sought to be condemned include: 
1. "Relief of Back Pain" or "Back Pain)} 
2. "Removal of Warts" 
3. "Bust Enlargement" or "Natural Bust Enlargement" 
4. "Migraine Relief" or "Headaches" 
. . . . [28 additional titles suggesting disease or structure/function ef-
fects] 
Although the claimant disputes whether the labeling of the tapes is 
false or misleading and whether they lack adequate directions for use, it 
does not dispute that the tapes were manufactured in an unregistered 
establishment, that the tapes themselves are not registered as medical 
devices, or that there was no premarket notification of their manufacture 
and sale. It follows that if, in fact, the tapes are medical devices, they are in 
violation of the Act and are subject to forfeiture. Therefore, the resolution 
of this action turns upon one question; are these tapes medical devices 
within the meaning of the Act? .... 
In January, 1981 Potentials Unlimited marketed over 100 tape record-
ings. Most of these are unrelated to health or medical problems, as 
evidenced by the fact that only 32 of the tapes are under seizure. The 
catalogue distributed by Potentials identifies many different "self-hypno-
sis" tapes with such titles as "Memory," "Good Study Habits," "Fear of 
Flying/' "Stop Smoking," "Freedom from Guilt," "Jealousy," "Self-Confi-
dence," "How to be Popular," "Be a Better Bowler," and "How to be a 
Great Golfer." ... The tapes are divided, by the catalogue, into several 
different "series." Most of the seized tapes fall under the "Health Series" 
although a few are listed under other categories. 
The Potentials Unlimited catalogue comprises the most significant and 
detailed promotional literature used to market the tapes .... The introduc-
tion refers to the tape recordings, at one point, as "learning"; however, 
read as a whole, the introduction leaves the impression that the positive 
suggestions contained on the tapes will act upon the "subconscious mind" 
to automatically bring about the changes which a person desires. Any 
teaching and learning aspects of the tapes are deemphasized or negated by 
the reference to "magic" and the implication that the tapes will work 
better, "without any interference from your conscious mind." Indeed, the 
introduction suggests that the tapes will be more beneficial if played during 
sleep, rather than actually being listened to and assimilated. 
The catalogue distributed in 1981 contains a disclaimer on page 3, in 
small but easily legible print, which states: 
No therapeutic claims of any kind are made with regard to 
these tape programs. We believe cures or improvements are a 
· matter of mind over matter and these tapes are not intended as a 
substitute for seeing your physician, or for medical treatment. 
Parental guidance is suggested for children's use. 
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An earlier version of this disclaimer was introduced into the catalogue 
sometime in 1980 after the FDA had begun investigating Potentials Unlim-
ited in February of that year. In previous catalogues no such disclaimer was 
included. 
The general introduction applies to all of the self-hypnosis tapes. The 
separate descriptive paragraphs contained in the catalogue refer by title 
and content to specific tapes and the specific problem or aspect of a 
person's life which that tape is designed to improve. The paragraphs are 
not specific regarding how the tapes work, instead they are anecdotal and 
conversational attempts to interest the reader in the specific tape. When 
combined with the general introduction, the individual descriptions gener-
ally leave the impression that the tapes will cure or treat the specific 
health-related problem indicated by the title of the tape. 
Generally there is no dispute that the tapes purport to effect [sic] 
structures or functions of the body or to mitigate the effects of dis-
eases .. 
The tape recordings themselves are very similar in style, structure, and 
content. They begin with brief instructions regarding the use and purpose 
of the particular tape, a standard hypnotic induction, and a series of 
statements, descriptions of visual images, and suggestions designed to 
influence the listener's thinking. Many of the images are repeated in more 
than one tape. 
All of tbe tapes clearly convey a number of related ideas revolving 
around a central theme, i.e. that a person's thoughts can influence their 
health or physical characteristics. This central theme is developed through 
an emphasis on the benefits of relaxation, the elimination of negative 
feelings such as anger, hate and jealousy, the creation of a positive self-
image, and the idea that reality is a reflection of one's own perceptions. 
Thus, according to the tapes, if a person thinks of himself in a particular, 
desired way, such as thin, free of allergies or pain, or generally healthy, the 
person will actually take on those desired characteristics. The tapes are 
clearly designed to communicate both this central tenet, and a method for 
putting it into practice. 
The court does not find that the tapes themselves are, apart from the 
claims made in the catalogue, designed or intended to be used in the cure 
or treatment of the physical and mental conditions indicated by their titles. 
Each tape is designed to teach a method of mental therapy which it is 
claimed will have beneficial effects on a particular aspect of a person's life. 
Any therapeutic results flow from the listener's successful implementation 
of the lessons contained on the tape. The purported "treatment", therefore, 
consists of the new thought patterns, beliefs, and behaviors which the 
listener has learned and adopted. The lessons contained on the tapes are 
communicated linguistically, and can be understood as well by reading 
transcripts of the tapes as by listening to the tapes. The contents of the 
tapes could also be transmitted directly between two individuals, using 
speech, without the use of tape recording devices. Therefore, the court finds 
that the mechanical components of these tape recordings are not part of 
any medical treatment and are used only as a means of communicating the 
verbal ideas and methods found on the tapes. 
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The tapes use hypnosis and hypnotic suggestion to communicate the 
ideas which they contain. The American Medical Association has recognized 
hypnosis as a useful "modality" for medical treatment, when used in 
conjunction with other treatments, since 1957. There are controlled studies 
indicating that hypnosis techniques may be useful in the removal of warts, 
the treatment of asthma, the mitigation of all kinds of pain, the reduction 
of myopia (near-sightedness), and in enlarging the female bust. In addition, 
there are anecdotal reports of the successful use of hypnosis to cure or treat 
virtually every condition encompassed by the 32 self-hypnosis tapes under 
seizure. Scientific research regarding the use of hypnosis in treating these 
other conditions has generally been negative. No research has been done, 
specifically, regarding the use of hypnotic tape recordings .. 
The fundamental finding regarding hypnosis, as it impacts upon this 
case, is that hypnosis is an ill defined and little understood concept which it 
is at least possible to view as a special form of communication or as a 
teaching device. This finding is significant since the court has found that 
the tapes under seizure communicate several clearly identifiable ideas. 
Since hypnosis can be considered a form of communication, the fact that 
the tapes use hypnosis techniques, does not prevent their classification as 
communication or teaching devices. The court rejects Dr. Reyher's testimo-
ny that communication must be logical, rational, or objectively purposeful. 
His definition of communication, besides being outside his field of expertise 
(as he readily admitted) would exclude poetry, art, music, and drama from 
the area of communication. Whatever the merits of such a restricted 
definition for some purposes, it does not comport with the ordinary concept 
of communication and is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes. 
There is no evidence that the self-hypnosis tapes manufactured by 
Potentials Unlimited can actually achieve the results which are claimed in 
the Potential catalogue. The tapes could be harmful if they caused someone 
to delay seeking adequate medical care for a disease condition. Additionally, 
the uncontrolled use of hypnosis could be dangerous because persons could 
develop anxiety reactions to some of the suggestions contained on the 
tapes. 
This case illustrates the difficulty which inevitably arises in balancing 
the ideal of philosophical and economic freedom against the practical need 
to protect unwary and vulnerable individuals from the claims of rapacious 
and unethical businessmen. . . . Underlying this case, of course, is the 
fundamental question of whether consumers should be allowed the choice 
of buying Potentials Unlimited self-hypnosis tapes without the prior inter-
vention and approval of the Federal government in the form of the Food 
and Drug Administration. 
Representing the other side of the balancing dilemma is society's 
concern for the gullible or the desperate individual who is induced to forego 
necessary medical treatment by the fraudulent, or simply mistaken, claims 
of the purveyors of medical drugs and devices. Although the construction 
and fantastic claims made for many quack devices over the years often 
seem quite amusing, use of these devices can have serious health conse-
quences. Whether sold to a consumer or a health professional, a device 
which does not perform as promised may pose a risk to health as well as an 
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l'Conom1c detriment to the purchaser. Reliance on unwarranted claims 
n1ade for a device, recommending use in serious disease conditions, may 
induce the purchaser to forego seeking timely and appropriate medical 
Lreatment. 
Fortunately, the court need not confront the problem presented in this 
case from the fundamental level of balancing the costs and benefits of the 
two competing perspectives suggested above. Congress has already engaged 
in such a balancing process and has determined that "medical devices" 
should be regulated by the FDA for the protection and benefit of the 
consuming public seeking medical treatment. In doing so, Congress has 
adopted a broad definition of medical device which is to be liberally 
construed in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act. United States v. 
Bacto-Unidish, 394 U.S. 784 (1969). 
There is no doubt that a tape recording is an implement, apparatus, or 
contrivance [as required by the FD&C Act definition]. However, a distinc-
tion must be made in this case between the tapes themselves, and the ideas 
that are contained on the tapes. Congress did not intend to regulate an 
article or device, the sole function of which is to serve as a means of 
communicating health related ideas or information. Had Congress had such 
an intent it would have expressly included books, the quintessential com-
munication device, in the definition of "medical device." It did not do so. 
The idea that a person can control and improve their [sic] health in 
general, or specific physical conditions, through the intervention of their 
thoughts, i.e. with their minds, is simply that, an idea, which anyone, 
including the claimant in this case, is free to helieve, to disseminate, and, 
unless specifically prohibited, to act upon as they wish by virtue of the First 
Amendment. As found by the court, tbe tape recordings under seizure in 
this case are designed and intended to communicate ard to teach certain 
ideas, beliefs, and mental processes which are claimed to have health 
benefits when adopted and practiced by the listener. Congress did not 
purport to regulate quack medical ideas or beliefs when it drafted the 
definition of medical device contained in the Act. By no stretch of language 
can an idea or a mental process be considered an instrument, apparatus, 
implement, machine, contrivance) implant, or in vitro reagent, or a similar 
or related article. 
The "liberal interpretation" to be accorded the Act must yield some-
what when it comes into conflict with First Amendment freedoms .... 
Since ideas, beliefs and mental processes do not come within the statutory 
definition they are outside the jurisdiction of the FDA. Mechanical devices 
which do no more than communicate or expound such ideas, beliefs and 
mental processes are likewise outside the jurisdiction of the FDA. To 
include such devices within the definition would have grave First Amend-
ment implications and would, by implication, bring health related books, 
magazines, and publications within tbe agency jurisdiction. That is a result 
Congress clearly did not contemplate or intend. 
The fact that the tapes in issue do no more than communicate certain 
ideas using hypnosis as a tool in that communication does not end the 
inquiry into whether these tapes, as marketed by Potentials Unlimited, are 
subject to regulation as medical devices. Articles and devices which have no 
• 
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intended therapeutic qualities may be regulated if they are sold by the 
vendor accompanied by therapeutic claims. Thus, the seller's objective 
manifestation of a therapeutic intent brings otherwise medically benign 
articles within the purview of the Act .... 
The therapeutic claims contained in promotional literature can convert 
the most innocent of articles into drugs or devices within the meaning of 
the Act .... The conduct of Potentials Unlimited in marketing these tapes 
as therapeutic medical devices is subject to regulation by Congress, even if 
the tapes themselves communicate ideas. 
As stated in the court's findings of fact, the catalogue distributed by 
Potentials Unlimited tells the reader through its general introduction, that 
the self-hypnosis tapes will work "like magic," by "saturating the subcon-
scious mind with positive suggestions." This language creates the expecta-
tion of an automatic and mechanical process by which suggestions will be 
implanted in the brain, much like a drug, and miraculous cures will result 
from the therapeutic effects of these suggestions. The whole introduction is 
designed to imply a therapeutic result from listening to the tapes, rather 
than a simple act of communication. Hypnosis is regarded, in the catalogue, 
as a treatment rather than a form of communication. Coupled with the 
titles of the seized tapes, an intended therapeutic use for the tapes is 
objectively manifested. This objective manifestation makes the tapes, as 
they are presently marketed, medical devices, to the extent they are used in 
treating disease or to affect body function .... 
The petition for condemnation against the . . . tapes . . . is grant-
ed .... 
Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer 
Products 
52 Fed. Reg. 36104 (September 25, 1987). 
FDA is making available for public comment draft policy guidance for 
the regulation of computer products. The draft policy guidance clarifies 
how FDA would apply existing statutory requirements to the regulation of 
computer products (i.e., both hardware and software) when such products 
meet the definition of a medical device in the Medical Device Amendments 
of 1976 .... 
Under the draft policy, FDA would not regard computer products used 
only for traditional "library" functions such as storage, retrieval, and 
dissemination of information-functions traditionally carried out through 
textbooks and journals-to be medical devices subject to regulation by the 
agency. Similarly, the policy notes that FDA's device regulations and 
authorities also would not apply to computer products used for general 
accounting or communications functions or solely for instructional pur-
poses, rather than to diagnose or treat patients. 
When a computer product is a "component, part, or accessory" of a 
product recognized as a medical device in its own right, the computer 
component is regulated according to the requirements for the parent device 
(unless the component of the device is separately classified). 
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Computer products which are medical devices, and not components, 
parts, or accessories of other articles which are themselves medical devices, 
are regulated with the least degree of control necessary to provide reason-
able assurance of safety and effectiveness. For example, many software 
products known as "expert" or "knowledge based" systems that are not 
used with existing medical devices and that are intended to involve compe-
tent human intervention before any impact on human health occurs (e.g., 
where clinical judgment and experience can be used to check and interpret 
a system's output) are exempt from registration, listing, premarket notifi-
cation, and premarket approval requirements. FDA is also not aware of any 
computer product that is not a component, part, or accessory of another 
device that would require la] premarket approval (PMA) application 
before marketing. 
The agency is cognizant of the need to safeguard First Amendment 
protections and recognizes that, in some cases, it may be difficult to make a 
clear distinction between software products that perform traditional 
"book" or "library" functions, and software products that fall within the 
definition of a medical device under the draft policy, based on their 
intended use in the diagnosis or management of health-related conditions. 
FDA believes flexible guidance is necessary for effective implementation of 
the medical devices law and specifically invites comments on the appropri-
ateness of the approach taken in the draft policy. 
NOTES 
1. Further Developments. A November 13, 1989, revised draft ufthe POLICY FOR 
THE REGULATION OF COMPUTER PRODUCTS reiterated the basic statements of the 1987 
draft. FDA has never finalized the policy. The agency has more recently announced 
that it is considering establishing a risk*based classification of stand~alone computer 
software products that fit the definition of a medical device, but it has not taken 
any further action. 65 Fed. Reg. 73822 (Nov. 30, 2000). See generally Bruce M. 
Fried & Jason M. Zuckerman, FDA Regulation of Medical Software, 33 J. HEALTH L. 
129 (2000); E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and 
Regulation of Medical Device Software, 52 Foon & DRUG L.J. 511 (1997); Dee Simons, 
Medical Device Software Regulation; An Industry Perspective, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J. 
189 (1997). 
2. Specific Case. In FDA Regulatory Letter BOS-88-10 (June 23, 1988), FDA 
Boston District Director E. J. McDonnell took the position that a computerized 
blood bank and laboratory management system that takes data directly from 
automated blood analyzers and uses it as the basis for labeling blood and blood 
components is a medical device and subject to the premarket notification requireM 
ments of section 510(k). This position was reaffirmed in 1994 in a letter from CBER 
Director Kathryn C. Zoon to Blood Establishment Computer Software Manufactur~ 
ers (Mar. 31, 1994). 
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In 1995, FDA announced that it was going to assert jurisdiction over 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and regulate their manufacture, labeling, 
and advertising. For legal authority, the agency invoked the FD&C Act. 
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Contending that tobacco products were responsible for as many as 400,000 
American deaths annually, the agency mounted what it considered a 
compelling case for government intervention. The agency's goal was to 
protect adolescents who had not yet begun to smoke. Its plan was designed 
to obstruct their access to tobacco and discourage manufacturer promotion-
al efforts to attract new smokers. FDA's notice of proposed rulemaking 
immediately precipitated litigation that probed the boundaries of the agen-
cy's legal authority. The eventual failure of FDA's initiative exposed new 
limits of the Act's definitions as measures of its regulatory jurisdiction. 
Decades before the 1995 announcement, FDA had asserted its authori-
ty over at least some tobacco products. Shortly after World War II, the 
agency successfully challenged the marketing of two brands of cigarettes 
that it claimed were illegal drugs. In United States v. 46 Cartons .. 
Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953), FDA seized a shipment 
of cigarettes whose labeling "represents that the article is effective in 
preventing respiratory disease, common cold, influenza, pneumonia" and 
more than a dozen other illnesses. The government charged that these 
express claims made Fairfax Cigarettes a "drug" under the Act, and thus 
that the product required FDA approval. The district court agreed and 
ordered the seized goods relabeled or destroyed. The manufacturer, of 
course, abandoned the challenged claims, effectively depriving FDA of 
jurisdiction. A similar result followed FDA's seizure of another brand of 
cigarettes making weight-loss claims. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons 
Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959). 
FDA thereafter appears to have lost interest in contesting the health 
claims made for different brands of cigarettes. Within a decade, however, 
Congress began to explore measures to combat the health effects of tobacco. 
In 1964 the Surgeon General released a ground-breaking report which 
documented the heavy price smokers paid for the pleasure of smoking. See 
SMOKING AND HEALTH. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964). The report inspired several 
proposals to regulate the manufacture, labeling, and sale of cigarettes and, 
later, of smokeless tobacco. During congressional hearings on these bills, 
FDA officials were asked what, if any, role their agency could play. Their 
uniform response was that FDA had no authority over cigarettes unless 
they bore claims that they could prevent or relieve disease. 
Ultimately, suggestions that FDA be given authority to regulate ciga-
rettes were rejected in favor of statutes passed in 1965 and 1969 curbing 
the labeling and, later, the advertising for cigarettes and requiring their 
labels to bear mild warnings about their health effects. The 1960s came to 
an end with no material change in the marketing of cigarettes despite 
mounting evidence of their adverse effects. 
Advocates of tobacco control, however, never lost hope that FDA might 
be persuaded to acknowledge, and then exercise, jurisdiction over tobacco. 
In 1977, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), a citizen action group, filed 
a petition urging the agency to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes under the 
FD&C Act and impose restrictions on their advertising and distribution. 
The petition cited evidence that smokers smoked to gain the physiological 
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"lfocts of nicotine, and it contended that these effects were thus "intend-
' ·cl." Once again, FDA declined to exercise jurisdiction: 
The petitioners have presented no evidence that manufacturers or 
vendors of cigarettes represent that the cigarettes are "intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body of man .... " 21 
U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(C). Statements by the petitioners and citations 
in the petition that cigarettes are used by smokers to affect the 
structure or any functions of their bodies are not evidence of such 
intent by the manufacturers or vendors of cigarettes, as required 
under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l)(C). 
Letter memorandum from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner, FDA, to ASH 
!Dec. 5, 1977), quoted in Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 
236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
The D.C. Circuit upheld FDA's refusal to regulate cigarettes in the 
following words: 
[B]y failing to introduce any evidence of vendors' intent--
whether based upon subjective vendor claims or objective evidence 
such as labeling, promotional material, and advertising-ASH 
placed itself in the position of having to meet the high standard 
established in cases where the statutory "intent" is derived from 
consumer use alone. Clearly, it is well established "that the 
'intended use' of a product, within the meaning of the Act, is 
determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional 
claims, advertising, and any other relevant source." Whether evi-
dence of consumer intent is a "relevant source" for these purposes 
depends upon whether such evidence is strong enough to justify an 
inference as to the vendors' intent. This requires a substantial 
showing. 
In cases such as the one at hand, consumers must use the 
product predominantly-and in fact nearly exclusively-with the 
appropriate intent before the requisite statutory intent can be 
inferred. . ASH did not establish, and arguably cannot establish, 
the near-exclusivity of consumer use of cigarettes with the intent 
"to affect the structure or any function of the body of man. . . " 
Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-40 ID.C. Cir. 
1980). 
In separate petitions, ASH also requested FDA to assert jurisdiction 
over both attached and detached cigarette filters as medical devices, based 
on a recommendation by an FDA advisory committee that they be classified 
as class III under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. Following a 
court order to rule on the petitions, Action on Smoking and Health v. Food 
and Drug Administration, FDLI 1978-1980 Jud. Rec. 862 (D.D.C. 1980), 
FDA denied both in a letter from Deputy Commissioner M. Novitch to J.F. 
Banzhaf, III, FDA Dkt Nos. 77P-0185 & 78P-0338/CP (Nov. 25, 1980). 
Both FDA and the D.C. Circuit in ASH left open the possibility that 
the agency might be able to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes if there were 
evidence that the manufacturers themselves intended their products to 
"affect the structure or function of the body." Events soon reopened this 
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line of analysis. In the early 1990s, several states sued the major manufac-
turers of cigarettes to recover the costs of state-funded medical care 
provided to smokers suffering from tobacco-related illness. In the course of 
discovery in these cases, some of the defendants disgorged documents that 
strongly suggested, and in the view of many proved beyond question, that 
the companies knew their customers smoked to gain the effects of nicotine 
and designed their products to satisfy this desire. These disclosures provid-
ed FDA the opportunity to revisit the issue left open by the ASH case: 
Could sellers of tobacco products be said to intend the bodily effects of 
nicotine? 
FDA faced this question shortly after the appointment of a new 
Commissioner, David Kessler. A series of petitions renewed demands that 
the agency assert jurisdiction over cigarettes as "drugs" or "devices" and 
take steps to curb or prohibit their sale. Kessler launched FDA's own 
extensive investigation into the cigarette business-how they were made 
and marketed, and what the manufacturers knew or intended about their 
effects. At the same time, agency lawyers were directed to design a plan for 
regulating cigarettes that would substantially dampen their appeal to 
younger people, without threatening an outright ban that could cause 
Congress to intervene. 
Shortly afterwards, FDA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in 
which it asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes as a "device" for delivering 
the "drug" nicotine. 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug. 11, 1995). The agency 
proposed measures to make cigarettes difficult for young people to obtain 
and less appealing to consumers generally, including mandatory carding of 
youthful customers, relocation of cigarette displays, and outright bans on 
the industry's favorite promotions, including sponsorship of concerts, art 
exhibits, and sporting events. To support this proposal, FDA contended 
that the evidence from company files made clear that the cigarette manu-
facturers did "intend" their products to affect the bodily functions of their 
customers. In addition, the agency asserted that the FD&C Act allowed a 
range of remedial options short of an outright ban. 
The cigarette manufacturers, along with representatives of advertising 
interests who saw FDA's prop'{."ed curbs on promotion as an assault on the 
First Amendment, did not wait for the rulemaking to conclude; they 
brought suit immediately, contending that FDA's lack of jurisdiction was so 
obvious that they need not exhaust the opportunity for comment that the 
agency had provided. The exhaustion question was never resolved, because 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, 
where the manufacturers had chosen to file their suit, did not take up the 
parties' cross motions for summary judgment until after publication of 
FDA's final rule in 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). In its preamble to 
the final rule, the agency made some adjustments to its defense of its 
jurisdiction and more significant revisions to its regulatory scheme, but its 
fundamental claims remained the same. The agency contended that the 
evidence now revealed that cigarettes were intended by their manufactur-
ers to affect the body by delivering nicotine and that FDA could restrict 
their promotion and sale as "devices" without having to confront the Act's 
categorical ban of any "drug" that cannot be shown to be safe. 
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The District Court scheduled a full day of argument on the cross 
111otions for summary judgment. Within a few weeks of the argument, 
.ludge Osteen rendered a decision that was widely interpreted as a victory 
rm· FDA. It focused on the central issue of the agency's jurisdiction to 
regulate. 
The precise question presented to the court is whether Con-
gress has evidenced its clear intent to withhold from FDA jurisdic-
tion to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed. The 
inquiry as to whether Congress bas directly spoken to the issue 
should begin with an examination of the text of the FDCA. A 
product is subject to the FDCA if it meets the statute's definition 
of a "food,)) ''drug," "device," or "cosmetic." Rather than itemize 
each product subject to regulation under the FDCA, Congress 
defined these categories broadly so that each encompasses a wide 
range of products. 
[T]be court finds that tobacco products fit within the 
FDCA's definitions of "drug" and "device." Therefore, Plaintiffs 
must prove to the court that Congress has expressed its clear 
intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco 
products in some place other than the text of the FDCA .. 
This court is convinced that neither the text nor the 
legislative history of the FDCA evidences clear congressional in-
tent to withhold from FDA authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts .. 
FDA offers that tobacco products fall within the FDCA's 
definitions of "drugs" and "devices" because tl1ey are "intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body." FDA explains 
that the nicotine in tobacco products affects the structure or 
function of the body by causing and sustaining addiction and by 
acting as a stimulant, sedative, and weight regulator. FDA further 
argues that manufacturers intend nicotine to produce such ef-
fects. 
Plaintiffs claim that a product's "intended use" can be estab-
lished only by manufacturer representations about the product. 30 
FDA counters that it appropriately relied on evidence of foresee-
ability, consumer use, and internal manufacturer memoranda to 
establish intended use. The text, legislative history, and past 
judicial and agency interpretation of the structure-or-function defi-
nitions of "drug" and "device" reveal that intended use may be 
established by evidence other than manufacturer representations. 
Although the regulations defining "intended use" [21 
C.F.R. 201.128, 801.4] clearly anticipate the establishment of in-
tended use through evidence of promotional claims, the plain 
language does not prohibit the establishment of intended use by 
30. FDA does not contend that tobacco 
1nanufacturers make any representations in 
connection with the sale of tobacco products. 
Therefore, if intended use can be established 
only by manufacturer representations, tobac-
co products would not be subject to regula-
tion pursuant to the FDCA. 
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other evidence. To illustrate, the regulations specifically provide 
that intent may be shown by circumstances surrounding the sale 
of the article and that one such circumstance could be the offering 
and use of a product for a purpose for which it is neither adver-
tised nor labeled with the manufacturer's knowledge. The regula-
tions defining "intended use" do not prohibit reliance on evidence 
other than manufacturer representations to establish intended 
use. 
Plaintiffs infer that Congress intended for the structure-or-
function definition of device to "apply only to products that are 
marketed to provide some medical or other health benefit to 
users." They support their argument in part by noting that 
Congress entitled its 1976 amendments to the FDCA's device 
provisions the "Medical Device Amendments" ("MDA"). The defi-
nition of device, however, expressly includes those products "in-
tended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man 
or other animals" and gives no indication that it is to apply only to 
those devices with a medical purpose. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) .. 
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 966 F. Supp. 
1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
On one important issue, however, Judge Osteen's opinion disappointed 
FDA. He ruled that the FD&C Act did not authorize the agency-by 
invoking its power to "restrict" the "sale" of a device--to impose any 
limits on its advertising. This issue, discussed infra p. 1051, was briefed on 
appeal but was not reached by the Fourth Circuit, which, by a 2-1 vote, 
overturned Judge Osteen's ruling upholding FDA's assertion of jurisdiction. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation v. Food and Drug Administra-
tion, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999). Predictably, the Supreme Court granted 
the government's Petition for Certiorari. 
The opposing opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer focused 
on several questions that together framed the issue of FDA's jurisdiction. 
Could an article's "intended" use be shown by evidence of tbe manufactur-
ers' private plans? Did the e"vidence assembled by FDA establish that 
cigarettes are intended to produce drug-like effects? Did the Act's require-
ments permit the continued sale of a drug or device that the agency had 
said was unsafe? And, critically, had Congress left FDA free to invoke its 
authority under the FD&C Act? 
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. 
529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
•JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products is 
founded on its conclusions that nicotine is a "drug" and that cigarettes and 
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smokeless tobacco are "drug delivery devices." Again, the FDA found that 
tobacco products are "intended" to deliver the pharmacological effects of 
satisfying addiction, stimulation and tranquilization, and weight control 
because those effects are foreseeable to any reasonable manufacturer, 
consumers use tobacco products to obtain those effects, and tobacco manu-
facturers have designed their products to produce those effects. As an 
initial matter, respondents take issue with the FDA's reading of "intend-
ed," arguing that it is a term of art that refers exclusively to claims made 
by the manufacturer or vendor about the product. That is, a product is not 
a drug or device under the FDCA unless the manufacturer or vendor makes 
some express claim concerning the product's therapeutic benefits. We need 
not resolve this question, however, because assuming, arguendo, that a 
product can be "intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body" absent claims of therapeutic or medical benefit, the FDA's claim to 
jurisdiction contravenes the clear intent of Congress. 
A threshold issue is the appropriate framework for analyzing the 
FD A's assertion of authority to regulate tobacco products. Because this case 
involves an administrative agency's construction of a statute that it admin-
isters, our analysis is governed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevrc~, a reviewing 
court must first ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue." Id., at 842. If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at an 
end; the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress." Id., at 843. But if Congress has not specifically addressed the 
question, a reviewing court inust respect the agency's construction of the 
statute so long as it is permissible. 
In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the ques-
tion at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a 
particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning-or ambiguity-of 
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. 
A court must therefore interpret the statute "as a symmetrical and 
coherent regulatory scheme," Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 
(1995), and "fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole," FTC v. 
Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959). Similarly, the meaning of 
one statute may be affected hy other Acts, particularly where Congress has 
spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand. In addition, 
we mnst be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which 
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and 
political magnitude to an administrative agency. 
With these principles in mind, we find that Congress has directly 
spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate 
tobacco products. 
Viewing the FDCA as a whole, it is evident that one of the Act's core 
objectives is to ensure that any product regulated by the FDA is "safe" and 
"effective" for its intended use. This essential purpose pervades the 
FDCA. Thus, the Act generally requires the FDA to prevent the 
marketing of any drug or device where the "potential for inflicting death or 
physical injury is not offaet by the possibility of therapeutic benefit." 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979). 
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In its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA quite exhaustively documented 
that "tobacco products are unsafe," "dangerous," and "cause great pain 
and suffering from illness." It found that the consumption of tobacco 
products presents "extraordinary health risks," and that "tobacco use is 
the single leading cause of preventable death in the United States." ... 
These findings logically imply that, if tobacco products were "devices" 
under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to remove them from the 
market .... 
Second, the FDCA requires the FDA to place all devices that it 
regulates into one of three classifications. See § 360c(b)(l) .... Given the 
FDA's findings regarding the health consequences of tobacco use, the 
agency would have to place cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in Class III 
because, even after the application of the Act's available controls, they 
would "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C). As Class III devices, tobacco products would be 
subject to the FDCA's premarket approval process. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(l)(Cl; 21 U.S.C. § 360e. Under these provisions, the FDA would 
be prohibited from approving an application for premarket approval with-
out "a showing of reasonable assurance that such device is safe under the 
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested on the labeling 
thereof." 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A). In view of the FDA's conclusions 
regarding the health effects of tobacco use, the agency would have no basis 
for finding any such reasonable assurance of safety. Thus, once the FDA 
fulfilled its statutory obligation to classify tobacco products, it could not 
allow them to be marketed. 
In determining whether Congress has spoken directly to the FDA's 
authority to regulate tobacco, we must also consider in greater detail the 
tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over the past 35 
years .... 
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965 
addressing the problem of tobacco use and human health .... 
In adopting each statute, Congress has acted against the backdrop of 
the FDA's consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority 
under the FDCA to regulate tobacco absent claims of therapeutic benefit by 
the manufacturer. In fact, on several occasions over this period, and after 
the health consequences of tobacco use and nicotine's pharmacological 
effects had become well known, Congress considered and rejected bills that 
would have granted the FDA such jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, 
it is evident that Congress' tobacco-specific statutes have effectively ratified 
the FDA's long-held position that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to 
regulate tobacco products. Congress has created a distinct regulatory 
scheme to address the problem of tobacco and health, and that scheme, as 
presently constructed, precludes any role for the FDA .... 
. . . Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with 
Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress 
has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here. For 
these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
is affirmed. 
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I I is so ordered. 
• JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE 
I ; 1 NSBURG join, dissenting. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regu-
late "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any 
!"unction of the body .... " Unlike the majority, I believe that tobacco 
products fit within this statutory language. 
In its own interpretation, the majority nowhere denies the following 
two salient points. First, tobacco products (including cigarettes) fall within 
the scope of this statutory definition, read literally. Cigarettes achieve their 
mood-stabilizing effects through the interaction of the chemical nicotine 
and the cells of the central nervous system. Both cigarette manufacturers 
and smokers alike know of, and desire, that chemically induced result. 
Hence, cigarettes are "intended to affect" the body's "structure" and 
"function," in the literal sense of these words. 
Second, the statute's basic purpose-the protection of public health-
supports the inclusion of cigarettes within its scope .... Unregulated tobac-
co use causes "[m]ore than 400,000 people [to] die each year from tobacco-
related illnesses, such as cancer, respiratory illnesses, and heart disease." 
61 Fed. Reg. 44398 (1996). Indeed, tobacco products kill more people in this 
country every year "than AIDS .. , car accidents, alcohol, homicides, 
illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
Taken literally, [the structure/function] definition might include 
everything from room air conditioners to thermal pajamas. The companies 
argue that, to avoid such a result, the meaning of "drug" or "device" 
should be confined to medical or therapeutic products, narrowly defined. 
The companies may well be right that the statute should not be read to 
cover room air conditioners and winter underwear. But I do not agree that 
we must accept their proposed limitation. For one thing, such a cramped 
reading contravenes the established purpose of the statutory language. For 
another, the companies' restriction would render the other two "drug" 
definitions superfluous. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 32l(g)(l)(A), (g)(l)(B) (covering 
articles in the leading pharmacology compendia and those "intended for 
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease"). 
Most importantly, the statute's language itself supplies a different, 
more suitable, limitation: that a "drug" must be a chemical agent. The 
FDCA's "device" definition states that an article which affects the struc-
ture or function of the body is a "device" only if it "does not achieve its 
primary intended purposes through chemical action within ... the body,'' 
and "is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its 
primary intended purposes." § 32l(h) (emphasis added). One can readily 
infer from this language that at least an article that does achieve its 
primary purpose through chemical action within the body and that is 
dependent upon being metabolized is a "drug," provided that it otherwise 
falls within the scope of the "drug" definition. And one need not hypothe-
size about air conditioners or thermal pajamas to recognize that the 
chemical nicotine, an important tobacco ingredient, meets this test .... 
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The tobacco companies' principal definitional argument focuses upon 
the statutory word "intended." The companies say that "intended" in this 
context is a term of art. They assert that the statutory word "intended" 
means that the product's maker has made an express claim about the effect 
that its product will have on the body. Indeed, according to the companies, 
the FDA's inability to prove that cigarette manufacturers make such claims 
is precisely why that agency historically has said it lacked the statutory 
power to regulate tobacco. 
The FDCA, however, does not use the word "claimed"; it uses the 
word "intended." And the FDA long ago issued regulations that say the 
relevant "intent" can be shown not only by a manufacturer's "expres-
sions," but also "by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the 
article." 21 CFR § 801.4. Thus, even in the absence of express claims, the 
FDA has regulated products that affect the body if the manufacturer wants, 
and knows, that consumers so use the product .... 
Nor is the FDA's "objective intent" interpretation unreasonable. It 
falls well within the established scope of the ordinary meaning of the word 
"intended." And the companies acknowledge that the FDA can regulate a 
drug-like substance in the ordinary circumstance, i.e., where the manufac-
turer makes an express claim, so it is not unreasonable to conclude that the 
agency retains such power where a product's effects on the body are so well 
known (say, like those of aspirin or calamine lotion), that there is no need 
for express representations because the product speaks for itself. ... 
The majority nonetheless reaches the "inescapable conclusion" that 
the language and structure of the FDCA as a whole "simply do not fit" the 
kind of public health problem that tobacco creates. That is because, in the 
majority's view, the FDCA requires the FDA to ban outright "dangerous" 
drugs or devices (such as cigarettes); yet, the FDA concedes that an 
immediate and total cigarette-sale ban is inappropriate .. , . 
In my view, where linguistically permissible, we should interpret the 
FDCA in light of Congress' overall desire to protect health. That purpose 
requires a flexible interpretation that both permits the FDA to take into 
account the realities of human behavior and allows it, in appropriate cases, 
to choose from its arsenal of statutory remedies .... 
NOTES 
L Action in Congress. In July 2004, the Senate passed legislation that would 
have given FDA specific statutory authority to regulate cigarettes and chewing 
tobacco. The legislation would not have put these products in the medical device 
category, but would have added a new chapter to the FD&C Act dedicated to these 
products, The legislation died in the House of Representatives. In March 2005, the 
bill was reintroduced in the House (H.R 1376) and the Senate (S. 666), but it was 
not been reported out of committee. 
2, FDA Approval of Smoking Cessation Products. In 1984, FDA approved a 
new drug application (NDA) for Nicorette chewing gum, which was indicated "as a 
temporary aid to the cigarette smoker seeking to give up his or her smoking habit 
while participating in a behavior modification program under medical or dental 
supervision." Nicorette, originally approved as a prescription drug but now sold 
over-the-counter, contains either 2 mg or 4 mg nicotine in each piece of chewing 
gum. FDA considered, but ultimately rejected, establishing an over-the-counter 
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monograph for smoking deterrent drug products. 58 Fed. Reg. 31236 (June 1, 1993). 
Consequently, any drug product that is labeled, represented, or promoted as a 
smoking deterrent is a new drug subject to the NDA process. 21 C.F.R. 310.544. 
FDA has since approved NDAs for nicotine transdermal patches and nicotine 
inhalers to aid in smoking cessation. The former are now available over~the~counter, 
whereas the latter remain available only by prescription. In 2002, FDA found that 
"nicotine lollipops" and "lip balm," promoted to assist smoking cessation were 
intended for use as drugs. The FDA based its decision on the manufacturers' claims 
that these products are a "convenient, tasty way" to replace cigarettes and helped 
to decrease the "hand to mouth" fixation associated with smoking. FDA Talk Paper 
No. T02-17, FDA Warns Sellers of Nicotine Lollipops & Lip Balm that their 
Products are Illegal (Apr. 10, 2002). 
3. FDA's Regulation of Other Tobacco and Nicotine Products. In December 
2001, after the Supreme Court decided Brown & Williamson, a consortium of major 
public health organizations submitted four citizen petitions requesting that the 
agency regulate various tobacco and nicotine products marketed as safer than 
traditional cigarettes or smokeless tobacco. 
Reduced-Risk Cigarettes. One type of product addressed by the petitions was 
reduced-risk cigarettes. Eclipse is a cigarette that primarily her.ts, rather than 
burns, the tobacco. It claims a reduced risk of cancer, respiratory inflammation, 
bronchitis, and emphysema as compared with other cigarettes. OMNI and Advance, 
which use other technologies, claim reduced carcinogenicity. (OMNI cigarettes are 
no longer commercially available.) The health organizations' petition urged FDA to 
regulate these cigarettes as drugs or medical devices, asserting that the explicit 
claims of risk reduction distinguished these products from the conventional ciga-
rettes addressed in Brown & Williamson. FDA has not yet ruled on these petitions. 
FDA Docket No. OlP-0570 (Eclipse); Docket No. OlP-0571 (OMNI and Advance). 
Some of the comments filed by industry opposing the petitions acknowledged that a 
cigarette making affirmative therapeutic claims, as opposed to risk-reduction claims, 
would fall under FDA's jurisdiction. In other words, they acknowledged the continu-
ing validity of the Fai1·fax Cigarettes decision, supra p. 78. 
Nicotine Water. The manufacturer of this product attempted to market it as a 
dietary supplement exempt from the FD&C Act's requirements for drugs. FDA 
granted the health organizations' petition requesting that it regulate Nicotine 
Water as a drug. FDA Docket No. OlP-0573. The agency concluded that the 
manufacturer promoted Nicotine Water to treat or mitigate nicotine addiction. It 
based this conclusion on statements on the manufacturer's website describing 
Nicotine Water as a smoking cessation product that "contains the nicotine equiva-
lent of 2 cigarettes" in one bottle of water and is "more effective than the Patch or 
Gum using Less Nicotine." Upon FDA's conclusion, the manufacturer of Nicotine 
Water then labeled its product a "homeopathic nicotinum formula." 
Tobacco Lozenges. Ariva, a mint-flavored lozenge, contains tobacco powder 
compressed into tablet form. The organizations petitioned FDA to classify tobacco 
lozenges like Ariva as "drugs" or, alternatively, as "foods" containing a food 
additive. FDA disagreed, concluding in part that Ariva was a "customarily market-
ed" tobacco product as defined by FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. See 
Docket Nos. OlP-0572 and 02P-0075. 
F. HUMAN BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 
The Public Health Service Act gives FDA jurisdiction to regulate 
"biological products." Under the PHS Act, most biological products are 
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subject to a regulatory regime similarly rigorous to that for drugs, includ-
ing premarket review by FDA for safety and effectiveness. Section 262(i) of 
the PHS Act defines "biological product" as follows: 
In this section, the term "biological product" means a virus, 
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood compo-
nent or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other triva-
lent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 
This definition, with its list of examples and reference to "analogous" 
products, is of a different character from the FD&C Act's product defini-
tions. It presents its own interpretive problems. 
David M. Dudzinski, Refiections on Historical, 
Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing 
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of 
Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and 
Monoclonal Antibodies 
60 Fooo & DRUG LAW JOURNAL 143 (2005). 
. . . Concurrent with rising demand for treatments for the major 
nineteenth century diseases, private entities began to manufacture vaccine 
and antitoxin. Especially after the introduction of diphtheria antitoxin in 
1894 from Germany, many small outfits run by pharmacies and physicians, 
as well as two large pharmaceutical ventures, H.K. Mulford Co. and Parke 
Davis, moved to produce antitoxins and supplant the government suppliers. 
While Mulford and Parke Davis had devoted significant resources to quality 
control and standardization of their antitoxin products, other smaller 
concerns manufacturing antitoxins did not. Instances of unscrupulous 
behavior by some smaller firms had previously resulted in a fake smallpox 
vaccine being sold in the early 1800s. Instances of contamination of 
commercial products also became a frequently recognized problem: large 
outbreaks of tetanus allegedly occurred via contamination of diphtheria 
antitoxin in the late 1890s and ~ontamination of smallpox vaccine in 1901. 
Though numerous investigations revealed that the tetanus outbreak in 
1901 was most likely not associated with the smallpox vaccine, the "re-
port[s] did not silence public outcry." The major manufacturers of biolog-
ics, pitted against each other by the assignment of blame for the tetanus 
outbreaks, found themselves under increasing scrutiny of the state govern-
ments and public. In response, the majors buried their disputes and 
redoubled their efforts to attack the smaller biologics manufacturers who 
were more likely to have "unsanitary and outmoded" facilities. Ultimately, 
it was deaths of thirteen children from tetanus-contaminated vaccine that 
"convinced Congress and the public that producing antitoxin or vaccine 
was not a simple matter like weighing out a dose of a drug on a scale" and 
provided an impetus for legislation. 
Congress responded to the recent outbreaks as well as to the compa-
nies' lobbying by enacting the Biologics Act of 1902, the first enduring 
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scheme of national regulation for any pharmaceutical product. The Biolog-
ics Act was groundbreaking in part because it set new precedents both in 
terms of shifting from retrospective post-market to prospective pre-market 
government review, and modifying the common law notion of punishing 
conduct only of intentional or reckless actors, in favor of moving toward 
pro-active safety measures for all entities. 
The Biologics Act exerted jurisdiction over "viruses, therapeutic se-
rums, toxins, antitoxins, or analogous products" as "biologics" that were 
intended for tbe "prevention, and cure of diseases of man." Each of the 
categories of regulated biologics represent immunologic agents, and Con-
gress seemed to select tbese particular substances out of particular concern 
for immunologic, allergenic, and (at least what was then perceived to be) 
possibly contagious side effects. Viruses and toxins function to stimulate 
development of active immunity and antibody production when introduced 
into humans. Vaccines had been made for decades by exposing patients to a 
relatively non-pathogenic strain of bacteria or killed or inactivated patho-
gens. Antitoxins and therapeutic serums confer passive immm.ity simply by 
providing preformed antibodies, often developed by another animal like 
horse or goat in response to the toxin. All of these products-even in their 
final form after "manufacturing" -remained relatively crude mixtures; in 
fact, most of the products regulated in 1902 had a purity less than 1 %. The 
Congressional concern for immunologic side effects was heightened espe-
cially in light of the biologics' animal origin and their parenteral, or 
injectable route of administration; compared to oral administration, where 
the digestive system provided some barriers protecting the body, injection 
gave the biologics direct access to the inner body. 
In 1963 United States v. Steinschreiber held blood plasma and 
other components derived from processing of blood were subject to biologics 
regulations as analogues to serum. 219 F. Supp. 373, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam). In contrast, in 1968 
Blank v. United States held blood and red blood cells were drugs but 
exempt from biologics regulation. 400 F.2d at 305 (5th Cir. 1968). Individu-
al adjudications are a poor means to develop any comprehensive regulatory 
scheme because of the lack of a guiding principle and the resultant 
fragmented, confusing system. Recognizing that every "[f]ederal court 
has held that blood is a drug" but diverged on the issue of blood as a 
biologic, Congress unified the law by amending the PHSA § 351 to include 
the classes of "blood, blood components or derivatives". Heart Disease, 
Cancer, Stroke, and Kidney Disease Amendments [to the Public Health 
Service Act] of 1970, 84 Stat. 1297, 1308 (Oct. 30, 1970) ... 
The very notion of a biologic has changed many times over the last 
century, and has deviated far from the root concern of grouping and 
regulating non-human organism (virus, bacteria, or large animal) immuno-
genic molecules. By statute, biological products are now "defined" as 
including viruses, therapeutic sera, toxins and antitoxins, vaccines, blood, 
blood components or derivatives, allergenic products, any analogous prod-
ucts, and arsphenamines used treating disease. Though several of these 
terms (e.g. therapeutic sera, antitoxin) lack crisp scientific meaning, no 
actual definition of "biologic" is offered in the statute or its regulations. 
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However, no definition is probably preferable to the alternative of 
scientifically invalid definition, such as for virus, which is "interpreted to 
be a product containing the minute living cause of an infectious disease and 
includes but is not limited to filterable viruses, bacteria, rickettsia, fungi, 
and protozoa." 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h)(l). It is also far from clear that the 
earliest premise of biologics regulation was even internally consistent, as 
many of the first substances considered to be biologics were not really 
immunogenic per se, but designed to confer passive immunity. The more 
modern additions to the family of designated biologics are also questiona-
ble. Arsphenamines, while toxic, do no more to affect the immune process 
or cause immunogenic toxicities than do other well-known antibiotics and 
anti-microbials. Moreover the "analogous" language greatly amplifies the 
specter of biologics: for example, a product is analogous to 1) a virus if it is 
merely prepared from any "potentially infectious agent", 2) a therapeutic 
serum if it contains "some organic constituent" from blood (amino acids 
and hormones, like insulin and human growth hormone, excepted), or 3) a 
toxin or antitoxin if it addresses human disease "through a specific im-
mune process." 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h)(5)(i)-(iii). When one considers that 
virtually every chemical, including small molecules, can be an allergen to a 
certain fraction of the population, and that "products analogous to blood" 
has been theorized to encompass everything from the most well-character-
ized and well-purified serum protein all the way to whole organs, bewilder-
ment about the definition of a biologic is understandable. 
NOTES 
1. Dual Classification. Because the definition of "biological products" refers 
exclusively to articles "applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease 
or condition of human beings," all biologics are simultaneously also drugs or 
devices. This dual classification raises many issues regarding the appropriate 
application of the requirements of PHS Act and the FD&C Act to biologics, as well 
as the division of responsibility over these products among FDA's biologics, drug, 
and device centers. These issues are addressed in Chapter VI. 
2. Human Cellular and Tiwsue-Based Products. Human tissue products have 
been used by doctors for decades. Skin, tendons, bones, heart valves, and corneas 
that are damaged or diseased are replaced by tissues removed the body of a donor. 
Semen, ova, and embryos are transferred to aid reproduction. Recent years have 
seen an explosion of research into human cellular products for therapeutic pur~ 
poses, including somatic cell therapy products and gene therapy products. FDA 
deems some human cellular and tissue~based products to be biologics, as well as 
medical devices or drugs. The agency's regulation of these products is discussed in 
Chapter VI, infra. 
